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
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CONTENTS

Mass Media Seen As Key To Effective Indoctrination	1
Knowledge of Marxism-Leninism Necessary for NVA Officers	11
Efforts Detailed for Recruiting Professional Soldiers	17
Commentary Provided on U.S. Military Bases Abroad	26
Manition Supply of Battalions Discussed	36
Advantages of Joint Soviet-GDR Officer Training Described	42
Problems in Radar Maintenance Cited	47
FRG Violations of Coastal Waters Cited	52
Figures Provided on CEMA Merchant Fleet Activities	56
Problems Cited in Anti-Mine Equipment	65

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MASS MEDIA SEEN AS KEY TO EFFECTIVE INDOCTRINATION

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Oct 74 pp 3-13

[Editorial by Col H. Knetsch, historian]

/Text/ Eventful and busy weeks and months in preparing the 25th anniversary of the GDR lie behind us. The pulse of our Workers and Farmers State was beating in every collective. Everywhere the competition was going on toward solving all tasks through good and very good performance and thus to contribute to ensuring a constantly high combat readiness and fighting strength.

Weeks like these made the basic position in the actions of the individuals as in the collectives stand out particularly clearly: Their firm alliance with the socialist state and the socialist community rallied around the Soviet Union, their unshakeable confidence in and loyalty to the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party, their determination to strengthen the military might and superiority of socialism and their will never to leave the enemy a chance.

In placing, in the good conscience of duty fulfilled, their soldiers' present on the birthday table, the members of the NVA and of the GDR border troops also reflected the effectiveness of our political-ideological work. But, as always, we cannot stop at what has been achieved, particularly since "anniversaries are not empty days of celebration to the communists and the class conscious part of the proletariat, but directions for the class struggle, guidelines for action."

Thus precisely we have to proceed in carrying on our political-ideological work so as to obtain deeper insights again and lasting effects for the

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development of consciousness. For only out of the increasingly better understanding of our class task grows the strong motivation toward conscious action in all military affairs.

The decisive importance of ideological work and the understanding that none of its sides and none of its forms must be slighted demand that time and again their requirements and consequences for the leadership be worked out in the various fields. The following discussion of the work of agitation is intended to direct attention at those areas in which still greater efforts are needed in order to advance content structure, organization and leadership.

Use Agitation Possibilities More Purposefully!

The Ninth Delegates' Conference of the SED party organizations in the NVA and the GDR border troops determined that constantly high combat readiness and a growing fighting strength are the decisive criteria for the effectiveness of political-ideological work. From it, accordingly, the high responsibility of agitation is derived. It must make daily contributions to the political-moral education of socialist soldiers' personalities and of military combat collectives, whereby to ensure a high combat readiness and fighting strength.

Agitation sees its function within the unity and interaction of all other areas of political-ideological work. Its special importance lies in that it will exercise its function without interruption, that is to say, in all situations.

In struggling for high combat readiness and growing fighting strength, agitation makes a very important contribution, in that it helps provide the members of the NVA and the GDR border troops with the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, strengthen them in their socialist convictions and modes of conduct, and develops their political-moral and psychological combat skills; as it constantly explains the policy of the SED, the CPSU and the other fraternal parties, informs on current political events, addresses itself at the daily tasks of military service and mobilizes for the fulfillment of orders, service regulations and instructions; and as it responds to moods and views, effectively exploits for educational purposes the attitude and performances of the individual and of the collective, popularizes good experiences and releases and motivates actions that are rich in initiative.

Viewed in this light, much depends on how the political organs succeed on all levels in proceeding strictly in accordance with the determinations of the agitation order in their applying agitation as a component of their overall political-ideological work. It includes the setting of priorities and giving variety and differentiation to agitation, pouring into it a demanding ideological-theoretic content--which also means being pertinent to what happens within the troops--and precise planning and organization.

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Offensive and Militarily Effective Agitation---a Leadership Requirement

In discussing agitation one can often hear the opinion that content is what counts. Questions of planning and organization, however, are not always given the attention they deserve. True enough, increasing the effectiveness of agitation is principally connected with enhancing its political-ideological content, its power of conviction. This truth yet does not justify ignoring other factors.

Today more than ever precise planning and organization in agitation work are indispensable to the commanding officer's deputy for political work and his work group in the troop unit. The increasing dynamics and complexity of political life call for circumspection, mobility and the ability to understand the essential tasks and connections and to shape the political work with foresight, accordingly.

The development of socialist military affairs also constantly brings up new questions. Combat training carried out in accordance with the new programs and the system of military service have given a different rhythm to the course of everyday service. No longer is agitation work restricted to the conventional time periods one was accustomed to.

Good experiences have this to teach: Wherever agitation is an equal and firm component of the systematically led total process of political-ideological work, a suitable concurrence and coordination exists with advanced social science education, political training, party, youth and culture-political work.

Proceeding from the unity and the specifics of these various sides, the concurrence and coordination is arranged in such a way that to a considerable degree, precisely through the help of agitation, the political-ideological work can be carried out uninterruptedly and continually, operationally and on a timely basis.

I think attention should also be paid to the experiences reported by our comrades, Lt Col Depka and Lt Col Pommer, in AUSBILDER, No 4, 1974, to the effect that many commanding officers include the most important measures on political work in the training schedules. As they also remark, this does not obviate the elaboration of special plans for certain training assignments, field camps or exercises. It remains important that the planning of political work be geared precisely to the fulfillment of training assignments, is coordinated in time with training schedules, is flexible to a certain extent and provides for responses to any given situation arising.

Practice in the Winter Unit proves: Newspaper exhibits during training breaks, individual political talks and agitation assignments, readings

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and song evenings around the camp fire, listening to radio news and informing all about what is essential, and working with the dailies, the camp papers, fliers and the radio-movie-van--none of this depends on being housed in barracks.

When one talks about the higher demands that have to be made on the organization of agitational work, it definitely includes that one will consistently enforce the political talks that must constantly be led by all forces of agitation. It must be carried on wherever our army members are, under the conditions of regular service in the barracks, of complex training in the field, in the service system, under alert conditions and at all other opportunities. Everywhere our superiors, officers and functionaries must explain to the army members the party policy, clarify new political phenomena and their connections, and answer the questions raised by the soldiers, NCO's, officer candidates and officers.

This is not primarily a matter of sufficient time, but it is an ideological matter. Therefore one should also make emphatically clear that the 90 minutes set down for daily political mass activity are not a matter that one may fulfill or not fulfill, but they are the minimum. There are no regulations, of course, on when and where the time is to be used for it. The problem is that the superiors and functionaries will in fact make use of every opportunity and that they, in doing so, apply on the whole the various forms and methods for political mass activity. Stereotypes, onesidedness and repetitiveness testify to impoverishment in the application of possibilities and means.

Improving the Work With the Mass Media--an Important Political-Ideological Leadership Task

Certainly, the interest in using the mass media for information and education has grown in all collectives. Analyses, however, show that the mass media are not being used sufficiently. For example, too few comrades still read a daily newspaper regularly. The same holds true for the weekly VOLKSARMEE. Nor can the work with certain radio and TV programs yet be called satisfactory. TV programs such as "Aktuelle Kamera" (Candid Camera), "Der schwarze Kanal" (The Black Canal), and the TV-Press-Conference are not regularly being watched by the soldiers and NCO's, for example. That affects the leadership activity, of course. The mass media are weapons of our party. Their use must not be left at random in any unit.

Two things are indispensable: For one thing, comrades must be given the most favorable possible conditions, in terms of space and time, for the work with the press and other written materials and for receiving radio and TV programs. And secondly, the superiors, the communists and agitators must call for attention to important articles, reports and transmissions:

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and must strengthen the soldiers' and non-coms' need to tune in regularly to the mass media. Part of it, finally, also is to engage in discussions on what has been read, seen or heard. The mass media not only satisfy the need for information, they elicit new needs too and stimulate continuing deliberations and the assumption of a personal position.

In agitation, as in political-ideological work altogether, progress is ensured to the extent that the unity between substantive-theoretic and organizational leadership in the ideological work is realized. Neither may one assume that uninterrupted and rigid leadership principally is an organizational problem, nor must the neglect of organization lead to the result that the correct substantive orientation fails to be realized.

The organization of the ideological work requires no less prudence and creativity than does the determination of its ideological content. Otherwise, good substantive conceptions frequently remain lonely thoughts. Therefore the point is, by paying attention to content and to the concrete conditions of the situation, always to select the most suitable forms, methods and means and to coordinate them carefully in the way they work together. This selection and coordination turns out to be a high leadership requirement for every political organ, every work group for political work.

On the one hand this requires to focus all the orchestration of the ideological work purposefully on the fulfillment of the military class task, without being narrow-minded about it.

On the other hand it requires that the specific ways in which the manifold forms, means and methods can work in all areas of the ideological work will be given attention in a still more differentiated manner, so that one's own potentials in consciousness formation can be brought fully to bear.

Proper Determination of the Content of Agitation!

We have the obligation still more thoroughly to connect agitation work with the ideological requirements of the class struggle in our times and with the ideological demands of everyday military service. The point is more deeply to penetrate the social connections, the historical inevitabilities of our epoch, and still better to understand the concerted policy of the SED and of the fraternal parties in order to be able to carry it out more effectively. Therefore every political organ must know how to lend a higher theoretical substance to agitation work and how to interest army members in new insights, developing in them an eagerness to dispute problems and to assume a position.

That implies that the opinion by anyone who is honestly struggling for truth and lucidity should be listened to with patience and that an answer

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be given to him. No one must shy away from frankly stating his opinion, no one must be afraid of being accused of being "obscure" only because he expresses a view that is not completely thought through to the end.

The Twelfth SED Central Committee session has emphatically worked out that clear political-ideological work is the key for further successes in all areas. First Secretary Comrade Erich Honecker states this in his concluding speech: "Nobody should neglect the fact that the unity of policy, ideology and economics exists not only in big and large-scale connections, but that it is effective as an inseparable unity in daily practical decision-making at every place of work, however, remote, in the motives underlying the activities of all people. All human activities are the result of coinciding economic, political and ideological interests and needs of whatever form. What creative powers and forward-pushing energies are being mobilized when the party organizations succeed in encouraging this concurrence and making it more distinct."²

It is my opinion that the unity to military policy, to our military tasks and to the daily activities is also formed in this manner. For that reason agitation must be given a content such that each comprehends his daily performance with respect to social effects and that it encourages him for further creative action.

The content of all measures of agitation always aims at one task--increasing the combat readiness and fighting strength of the units, troop components and staffs. The success of the work will be measured on how one succeeds in educating the soldiers, NCO's and officers to become military class fighters who struggle with conviction for permanently high performances in their political work, in combat training, in the service system, and in reliably securing the state borders. Political consciousness and a deep understanding of the combat task are expressed in the conscientious and disciplined fulfillment of all military duties.

It is being confirmed time and again that it is correct to place the daily struggle on behalf of fulfilling the concrete political and military tasks into the sphere of fundamental questions. It is precisely this that makes clear why it is our concern, again and again, to comprehend those fundamental questions in their historical significance. Aware of the repercussions of clarity in the fundamental questions, agitation will:

--further strengthen the conviction of the growing superiority of socialist society. "The strengthening and blossoming of world socialism, on the one hand, and the unprecedented intensification of the general crisis of capitalism, on the other, supply the proofs, every day anew, for the truth that only socialism can solve the basic social problems of mankind and ensure social progress."³

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--prove the correctness of the SED policy and of the road we have taken. With it, the class pride of all members of the NVA and of the GDR border troops in the magnificent achievements by the workers and farmers power should be further enhanced and become the source of new revolutionary deeds.

--demonstrate "that the growing might and the Leninist peace policy of socialism increasingly determine world politics and constitute the decisive cause for the turn from the cold war to the security of lasting peace in Europe and in the world."⁴

--thoroughly exploit and generalize the experiences gained in the collaboration with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries and further promote the new relations and modes of thought and conduct in the spirit of socialist internationalism.⁵

--carry on an effective confrontation with all shades of the bourgeois ideology through an offensive and convincing dissemination of our Marxist-Leninist world-outlook.⁶

The discussion of all the problems mentioned shall and will enter into a better understanding of the international power ratio. And indeed, here is a field to which agitation must always give the greatest attention. The proper awareness of the power ratio and its development is very important for a firm attitude by the soldiers, NCO's, officer candidates and officers. It is important for the confidence and certainty of victory in which they live and fulfill their duties. Here, awareness is affected by forward-pushing as well as obstructing factors. The wealth of current events, the to and from of the struggles on many fronts, the variety of diplomatic, political, economic and also military activities--all that causes reactions in the mind, creates hopes as well as fears, and leads to correct or false conclusions. And so it is all the more important that we work most carefully on this problem and answer the questions with the power of proof, by pointing to those truly decisive and long-range factors that cause the movement of class forces and of the changes in strategic positions.

More Attention to Information and Argumentation

One of the key problems in our work of agitation is the further development of argumentation and information. Especially those requirements are growing extraordinarily fast. We should much more frequently recall what Comrade Werner Lamberz said at the SED Central Committee conference about agitation and propaganda with respect to the requirement for information and argumentation: "Only such information activity which presents the nature and the mode of appearance of events still more comprehensively and, at the same time, with more variety, facts and knowledge, and in a more timely and impressive way, fulfills the growing needs of the educated

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reader, listener and spectator, those that the active builder of the socialist society needs, by which he takes part and wants to take part in the whole world of socialism and the revolutionary processes on the entire globe. A higher quality of argumentation means disclosing the political nature of phenomena more accurately, regularly and expeditiously, revealing the motives of those who act, making insights available, and presenting our viewpoint logically and convincingly in every matter. That calls in every respect for a combative stance in the sense of struggle on behalf of implementing the party decisions in life, against resistance, difficulties, laziness, discouragement or negligence. It means passionate struggle for what is new socially, for what we want to help achieve a breakthrough, what we want to see applied and triumphant everywhere. A combative stance, above all, in the confrontation with the adversary."7

It follows from these considerations that we must always try to establish interrelations between information and argumentation and the thinking as it really exists, the interests, tasks, actions and modes of conduct by the members of the army. We would therefore be well advised rigorously to eliminate all the signs of such practice that would, from training cycle to training cycle, principally merely issue the order for information and argumentation but would not itself combine information with the moods and questions that come up, not adding an argument of its own. This continues to be of concern to the functionary in the group, in the platoon--mainly the agitator--because he can no longer pass on the order, he must actually engage in argument.

The point for the political organ on each echelon: Relate information to the concrete situation, make it pertinent to practical matters and thereby enhance its modifying effect, while also elaborating arguments of one's own. Central arguments, from top to bottom, have to be combined with specific problems in every given case. They have to be supplemented and rendered concrete. Only to pass on or to offer information and argumentation is not enough.

No information and argumentation appears for its own sake. They have to function as means, as an instrument of education toward class consciousness and the proper thought, conduct and action. Has one then always given adequate attention to this educational effect that is to be obtained?

Important is to design argumentation and, what is still more important, to work with it in such a way that in any case the members of the army pay attention to it and that they themselves will regard the statements and orientation as important. That will help develop a correct collective public opinion which will be instrumental in forming norms of conduct. For it, argumentation must be closer to life. If that is not achieved and if everything is presented as smooth, unproblematic and free of contradiction, boredom may ensue. Well intended words may meet with lack

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of understanding or may be even rejected with mockery because life, under certain circumstances, does not look exactly the way this or that comrade pictures it. And finally, the right language is an essential aspect of argumentation. It must accord with the educational level as well as with the sensitivities of those addressed. Thus, the language must be simple, clear and vivid.

It must always be channeled through sentiment. Argumentation must not, as Kalinin once said, be like moonlight which does not warm.⁸ It must be understandable, offensive, combative and party-minded. From Lenin comes the advice: "Maximum of Marxism means a maximum of common understandability and simplicity."⁹

A soldier, NCO and officer does not like to be persuaded, he wants to be convinced. He always wants to think along and does not want to be served, ready made, every conclusion as indoctrination, as "moral."

Argumentation is an understandable, convincing explanation of ideological connections, the commenting on important events, the mobilization for the fulfillment of political and military tasks. The arguments provided by the political departments and work groups for political work will be most effective after collective deliberation. They should never merely represent the views of the superior officer or the chief instructor in political mass activity. Consultations help in working out argumentations on such matters that are in fact not quite clear or on the understanding of which the fulfillment of political and military tasks depends.

Argumentations will be all the more effective, the faster there is a reaction to events or military tasks. For the political organ it is therefore important that it will rapidly comprehend any new situation and the specific ideological requirements that follow from it. It must neither let itself be surprised by nor made to drift with events.

FOOTNOTES

1. E. Thaelmann, "Geschichte und Politik. Artikel und Reden 1925 bis 1933" (History and Politics. Articles and Speeches 1925 to 1933), Berlin, 1973, p 26.
2. E. Honecker, "Fresh Successes on the 25th Anniversary of the GDR-- From the Concluding Speech by Comrade Erich Honecker." In: "12. Tagung des ZK der SED (Twelfth Session of the Central Committee of the SED), Berlin, 1974, p 115 f.
3. Hermann Axen, "From the Politburo Report to the Twelfth Session of the Central Committee of the SED," p 75 f.

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4. Ibid., p 76.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p 77.
7. W. Lamberz, "Ueber die Aufgaben von Agitation und Propaganda bei der Weiteren Verwirklichung der Beschluesse des VIII. Parteitages der SED" (Concerning the Tasks of Agitation and Propaganda in the Further Implementation of the Decisions of the Eighth SED Congress), Berlin, 1972, p 58 f.
8. M. I. Kalinin, "Ueber kommunistische Erziehung" (Concerning Communist Education), Moscow, 1949, p 65.
9. V. I. Lenin, "Werke" (Works), Vol 36, Berlin, 1962, p 440.

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KNOWLEDGE OF MARXISM-LENINISM NECESSARY FOR NVA OFFICERS

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Oct 74 pp 34-41

[By Lt Col E. Hocke, doctor of philosophy at the Fredrich Engels Military Academy]

/Excerpt/ Marxist-Leninist philosophy plays a special role as the ideological and general methodological foundation for all sciences--socialist military science among them. This was emphasized by Comrade Erich Honecker when he pointed out that it was "Marxist-Leninist social science that forms the foundation of all branches of science, with special emphasis to be given to the importance of Marxist-Leninist philosophy."¹ As the science of the general laws of nature, society and human thought, Marxist-Leninist philosophy is the ideological-theoretical foundation and the general methodology² of Marxism-Leninism, which expresses itself in all its components (philosophical materialism, the materialist dialectic, dialectic-materialistic epistemology, historical materialism, and so forth). The conscious application of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in the theory and practice of socialist military affairs essentially helps ensure at all times a class-oriented political approach to all military questions and the leadership role of the Marxist-Leninist party in the development and application of socialist military science.

In this connection one must deal with the question of the relationship between philosophy and military science. An officer working in military theory or, even more, in the practical field does fulfill special tasks of applying military theory. This could give the impression as if, for solving such tasks successfully, one might need special military knowledge and the experiences that go with it, to be sure, not however, absolutely, a knowledge of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, its ideological-theoretic statements and methodological principles. Such views, which

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are positivistic in essence, not only constitute a gross error, but they may mean abandoning an essential advantage of socialist military science, a fundamental source of its superiority. There were heated ideological disputes about this even in the years during which Soviet military science originated, especially with Trotsky and his followers.³ The party resolutely rejected the anti-Leninist views of the Trotskyites who claimed that military affairs were merely a trade and that Marxism had no relevance to military affairs, that it would be perfectly adequate in military affairs to be a narrowly defined "expert;" one should proceed solely from the "internal factors of military affairs." By adopting such views, the Trotskyites had placed themselves on the ground of idealistic philosophy, the ground of positivism. At the present, such notions are typical of various revisionist utterances on general problems of military affairs.

For an officer of a socialist army, an exact and thorough knowledge of the ideology and methodology of Marxism-Leninism and concrete technical knowledge and practical experiences in the field of military theory and practice remain an inseparable unity. That is exactly what the Eighth Party Congress has emphasized. The Marxist-Leninist philosophy is a key to the solution of all theoretical and practical problems. It is not, however, as V. I. Lenin emphasized, a universal means through which one could, without concrete expert knowledge, solve all practical questions.

A thorough and secure mastery of Marxist-Leninist philosophy within the framework of comprehensive knowledge in the field of Marxism-Leninism altogether, a high class consciousness, firm knowledge in military science, and the ability to apply and realize all this through practical action in raising fighting strength and combat readiness are important to expert leadership activity by every superior officer in our socialist army. To no minor extent depend the power and strength of socialist armed forces and their superiority over the imperialist armies on it, in peace as well as in arms struggle. In present times, when a great number of specific new demands are being made on military science, it becomes more important than ever that one has the qualitatively better knowledge in military science and the ability to apply it more effectively than the enemy. The great achievement by Soviet military science prove that it is possible only on the basis of Marxist-Leninist philosophy to cope with those great theoretical and practical demands in the fullest that the tempestuous development of military affairs is making on military science.

The Connection Between Marxist-Leninist Philosophy and Military Practice

Marxist-Leninist philosophy, in inseparable unity with the other components of Marxism-Leninism, forms the unified internationalist ideological-theoretic and methodological foundation for the scientific military policy of the socialist community of states and for Soviet military doctrine. This also makes possible ensuring our military science and its tasks as formulated by the Marxist-Leninist party.

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With the scientific analysis, definition and explanation of the nature of war and its causes, the nature and character of the armed forces, and the role of moral and other factors, historical materialism makes a decisive contribution to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the armed forces. Socialist military science "is based on the methodological theses of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and on the armed forces."⁴

Marxist-Leninist philosophy furnishes socialist military science with the general methods and methodological principles for understanding and practical action. This is in a special way a current matter in view of the higher demands on the theoretical work in the field of military science and on the most rapidly possible translation of insights proven to be true into military practice. "The fundamental changes in military affairs and the elaboration of new problems in the theory and practice of warfare require a still more thorough mastery over Marxist-Leninist methodology. It is impossible to carry out such a scientific elaboration successfully, to advance the theory and practice of military affairs, and to solve the problems of the development of military technology and of the organization of the armed forces, unless one applies the method of the Marxist-Leninist dialectic."⁵

That also applies in particular to the application of the basic methodological principles of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. They consist above all of objectivity, the unity of party-mindedness and scientific method; of taking everything into account; and of a concrete historical approach and the disclosure of the internal contradictions as the source and impulse of movement and development.

Consciously proceeding from these basic methodological principles in their dialectic unity significantly helps avoid any kind of subjectivism, which especially under military conditions could be fatal. Soviet comrades have written about this: "Subjectivism originates when the subject wrongly assesses his possibilities of affecting the situation and attempts to act in opposition to their demands. Subjectivism in military affairs results from ignoring the objective laws and demands of life. The danger of subjectivism is especially great under the conditions of the armed forces, where commanders and leaders have many rights vis-a-vis their subordinates. This is an error that mainly people fall prey to who are inadequately formed ideologically, who are convinced of their own infallibility and extraordinary qualities and unwilling to rely on the experience and creativity of the masses."⁶ Overcoming all forms of subjectivism thus primarily is a task of political-ideological education, for which the commanding officers, the political organs and the party organizations carry a great responsibility.

As a component of Marxism-Leninism, Marxist-Leninist philosophy makes a decisive contribution to class-bound education and to the ideological

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forming of the bearers of socialist military science, the members of the socialist army, especially the special military science cadres, and the commanders and officers altogether. It shapes the ideology and ethics of the officers in the socialist army and educates them for dialectic thinking. A simple, formal enumeration of individual categories, guidelines and definitions of Marxist-Leninist philosophy plus "adorning" them with "military" examples contradicts the spirit of our philosophy as much as does an all too practical handling and conveying of philosophical principles that would neglect their ideological-theoretical content. This is also important to how one proceeds, theoretically and methodologically, in the field of military theory and practice, especially for the relation to military science, and the study, mastery, application and further development of it--that is to say, for realizing the advantages and superiority of socialist military science in everyday practice.

Marxist-Leninist philosophy is the ideological and methodological foundation for ensuring the dialectic unity of theory and practice and of scientific prediction. Under current conditions it has gained special importance. "The main demand on Soviet military science," the Soviet Defense Minister writes, "is that it will at all times be ahead of practice and will anticipate, will uncover the possible ways in which military affairs will develop, break the path for practice and thereby expedite the process of the personnel's training and education, improve it and enhance a continuous increase of combat readiness among the armed forces."⁷

The precise criterion for this are the successes in consolidating the socialist consciousness of the members of the army, the real increment in fighting strength, and the results in increasing the combat readiness of our army.

Finally Marxist-Leninist philosophy supplies the theoretically and methodologically extremely important classification of the system of sciences, military science among them, and the methodological foundation for classification within military science itself. That makes it at the same time an essential foundation for a meaningful application of various separate sciences and their methods, such as mathematics, cybernetics, information theory and game theory, operations research and others. Consciously proceeding from the doctrines of Marxist-Leninist philosophy ensures proper proportions in the application of quantitative and qualitative methods. It prevents any overestimation or underestimation of various structural sciences and their possibilities and protects from taking over positivistic conceptions, precisely such as were taken over by a number of important bourgeois representatives of these sciences. Consciously proceeding from the doctrines of Marxist-Leninist philosophy thus also prevents, in accepting valuable scientific insights from bourgeois scientists, that alien ideological ballast is accepted along with it resulting from the idealistic ideological-philosophic position of those scientists.

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Marxist-Leninist philosophy is an essential ideological and methodological foundation for unmasking and refuting all shades of the opponent's ideology and their influence in the military field.

These are certainly only a few aspects of the role of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in the field of military theory and practice. They demonstrate the great responsibility of all social scientists, especially of those who are working in the field of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in the socialist army. Equally clear becomes the political responsibility of all those who are working in the field of military theory and practice--especially the officers--for the study, the firm and lasting appropriation and the skilled application of Marxist-Leninist philosophy within the framework of the study of Marxism-Leninism. The study of Marxism-Leninism in close connection with the party resolutions and the basic documents on army leadership, and the drawing of ideologically and methodologically justified conclusions for military theory and military practice, are indications that political responsibility has deeply been understood. Through it there occurs a process of constant mutual enrichment by the application of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in the field of military theory and practice and the philosophical generalization of military science insights and experiences from military practice.

In this inseparable alliance between Marxist-Leninist philosophy and socialist military science there lie at the same time basic advantages our military science has over the military science of the imperialist class enemy. Our model for this close alliance always has been and is Soviet military science.

FOOTNOTES

1. E. Honecker, "Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den VIII. Parteitag der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands" (Report of the Central Committee to the Eighth SED Congress), Berlin, 1971, p 95 f.
2. By general methodology we mean: The general doctrine of the methods and understanding of practical action and the general methods and principles of knowledge and practical action. This general methodology cannot be any single science whatever (mathematics, mathematical logic, cybernetics, and so forth), but it can always only be Marxism-Leninism and, especially, its philosophy--dialectic and historical materialism.
3. A. S. Milovidov, "The Philosophic Analysis of Military Thought." In: MILITAERWESEN, , Berlin, No 10, 1973, p 57 f.
4. A. A. Grechko, "Die Streikkr fte des sowjetischen Staates" (The Armed Forces of the Soviet State), Moscow, 1974, p 287 (in Russian).

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5. Ibid., p 335 f.
6. Authors Collective, "Militaerische Theorie und militaerische Praxis" (Military Theory and Military Practice), Berlin, 1973, p 179.
7. A. A. Grechko, op. cit., p 335.

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EFFORTS DETAILED FOR RECRUITING PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Oct 74 pp 63-69

[By Col H. -U Selke, doctor of philosophy]

/Text/ The decisions and results of the Eighth SED Congress were also the point of departure for giving further content and form to the matter of getting military recruits. The first results are evident in the following, among other things:

--All of those who bear responsibility for insuring recruitment of a professional military in the long run gained a deeper political-ideological insight into the necessity and significance of a reliable defense of our socialist achievements and the long-term recruitment of a professional military cadre. There is growing recognition that the recruitment of young people for a military career depends on how fundamental socialist convictions can be developed and solidified among them. Socialist military education provides the decisive prerequisites for this goal.

--Recruitment is increasingly regarded as a total social concern and realized as a component of general career counseling. This is reflected in the closer and effective cooperation among the National People's Army, state organs, as well as social organizations. Attesting to this are countless initiatives and activities, especially by the SED, the state organs, the FDJ, the GST /Society for Sports and Technology/ as well as the general polytechnical and expanded secondary schools. Typical is the successfully developing work of the "FDJ Recruitment Collective for the Military Professions," the military political and military athletic mass

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action "Signal GDR 25," and the "Mandate for Struggle IV, Signal Obligation Honorary Service," which participates in all the basic organizations of the FDJ and GST in the framework of the previously mentioned efforts.

This development results in the fact that the quantity, and quality of the recruited professional officers and NCO's are increasing. Even at the end of the ninth grade and beginning of the tenth grade, more and more young people consciously decide for a military career and apply for it in writing. In this connection the regulations for recruitment procedures have proved themselves appropriate and effective.

The purpose of this article is to make generally known some of the experiences gained in the long-term recruitment of professional military.¹

Ideological Work-Cornerstone of Military Recruitment

The Ninth Delegates Conference of the SED organizations in the NVA and in the GDR border troops calls upon the military commands "to strengthen, in a common effort with all state and social organs, political-ideological work for recruiting professional military cadre, especially the sons of class-conscious workers, of party and state functionaries, and last but not least, sons of professional soldiers."²

Ideological work is also the cornerstone in leadership activity in the sphere of long range recruitment of a professional military cadre. This follows already from the fact that the principles for long-term recruitment and the measures established for it must insure above all a higher quality of professional military cadre. It requires intensive political-ideological work so that all those responsible for recruitment correctly grasp the essence of the task and recognize what the particular consequences of their activity are. In many cases, rethinking has to take place and many cherished conceptions and practices must be changed. That is not always easy.

What kinds of consequences follow from the principles of long-term recruitment of professional military? For example, the following are necessary:

--ideological problems and tasks be the focal point of all attention and cooperation by those who participate in recruitment;

--recruitment is accorded a worthy place in the leadership activity of all institutions;

--campaign-style actions of individual recruiters be overcome once and for all and that we recruit, prepare, and tend to professional military in a long-range, continuous, and coordinated manner;

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--a constant, mutual exchange of information take place on measures and results, etc.

Pertinent to recruitment is also the fact that higher tasks always mean in the first place higher ideological demands on the person. This applies as well to young people as to all those responsible for recruitment. Even the best organization is not sufficient to bring us to the goal. Every step must be prepared ideologically.

In the second place, the current complicated situation of international class struggle requires that special attention be devoted to ideological work. The April meeting of the Political Advisory Committee of the Warsaw Pact states was able to confirm with satisfaction "that tendency toward detente is currently the decisive element in the development of the situation on the European continent and in the world as a whole." At the same time, it had reason to issue the following statement: "As long as the NATO bloc continues to exist and no effective measures for disarmament are realized, the Warsaw Pact countries consider it necessary to strengthen their defensive capabilities and to develop close cooperation among themselves to this end."³

For some of our young people, it is often difficult to grasp the full scope of this dialectic of class struggle, to understand the connection that exists between realizing the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations between states having different social orders, and the further raising of military strength and combat readiness of the united forces of the Warsaw Pact. Lack of clarity on this question can in turn lead to doubts concerning the necessity of strengthening our republic and the socialist commonwealth militarily as well as concerning the meaning and prospects of military careers.

In our ideological work, we must take into consideration the fact that the aggressive imperialist powers try to undermine the growing defense readiness of our youth by means of ideological diversionary tactics. An important prerequisite for effective and successful work in recruiting our youth for a military career consists in providing them and their parents as well as all state and social forces active in military recruitment with full clarity on such questions as:

--the necessity and meaning of the further military strengthening of our republic and the socialist commonwealth, even under conditions of the change taking place toward detente;

--the unchanged aggressive nature of imperialism, even if it can be forced to more realistic positions in its foreign policy on the basis of the changed power relationship which has taken place in favor of socialism;

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--the meaning and currently far-reaching prospects of the military career, even in view of the negotiations taking place in Vienna on reduction of armed forces and armaments. We must make convincingly clear the role of the socialist armed forces in the comprehensive offensive of socialism and its military class mission in the complicated and contradictory course of international development.

In the third place, ideological work in the recruitment of military professionals is of first priority because it is a matter of creating among youth a politically conscious and stable decision to adopt a military career. This decision has far deeper, more principled, and greater personal consequences than the choice of any other profession.

For the Early Recruitment of Professional Military Cadre

In order that we do justice to the growing qualitative demands of the future military cadre, it is necessary to thoroughly realize the principle of making an early decision for a military career. Only by a process taking many years can the requisite number of young people through the ninth grade be brought to the stage where they will decide on a military career consciously and out of socially worthy motives.

Early and principled readiness is the prerequisite to guide applicants in such a course of development and training plan so as to assure comprehensive agreement between:

--personal interests and social demands, career preferences and operational requirements;

--the personal prerequisites and the specific demands which require a particular training plan;

--the military training plan, which is provided and the course of development and education of the applicant in the civilian sphere before call-up.

Such a long-term procedure also creates more favorable possibilities to guide the best applicants into the decisive training plan--that of command. Finally, a three-to-four-year headstart affords a fundamental and comprehensive preparation of the recruit in the "FDJ Recruiter Collective for Military Careers" in testing his dedication and in effectively tending to his education until call-up time.

All in all, early recruitment of young people for military careers contributes to the securing of the leading role of the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party as well as to a high quality and favorable assemblage of cadre, and thereby to a higher degree of military strength and combat readiness.

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For Rigorous Leadership in the Long Range Recruitment of Cadre

The comprehensive tasks which must be solved over the space of several years in the long range recruitment program, and the requisite coordination of the activity of a large number of people from all social spheres that take part in the program which must be achieved, require that this process be led rigorously. What First Secretary Comrade E. Honecker said at the ninth meeting of the SED Central Committee applies also in this connection: "Every new task...is also a new demand for leadership activity, for its further development."⁴

What must be given special attention in leadership activity? Starting from the military regulations concerning long range safeguarding of the recruitment of professional military personnel, and from the goals and measures spelled out therein which must be conscientiously observed, it is important for all institutions participating in recruitment to define their responsibility and tasks jointly with due consideration for current and local conditions prevailing at any given time. Since we are dealing with a very dynamic process in the recruitment program, this joint adjustment and coordination of the work of all participants is not a one-time task, but one to be solved periodically. An overall analysis of the current situation is therefore a prerequisite.

The whole recruitment process is to be planned, organized, and led in such a way that all steps must be realized in a unified way with full consciousness of goals. Included in this is the need to put at the disposal of all those participating in recruitment work exact knowledge of goals and the particular tasks to be solved. It is the task especially of the military commands to constantly transmit this knowledge and information to all those participating in recruitment. They must be informed in detail about the quantitative and qualitative aspects of prospective and annual setting of tasks and also about the current status of their fulfillment. Only in this way is unified and goal oriented action possible.

Experience from the Magdeburg regional military command and others have shown that it is pertinent to proceed in recruitment leadership according to the leadership cycle applied in troop leadership. That means thorough clarification of tasks, precise timing, comprehensive evaluation of the situation, a concrete decision, organization of the cooperation of all participants, uninterrupted leadership, and effective control. In this connection, it is important to have the necessary documentation, which should be uncomplicated and not manpower consuming.

In close connection with this requirement is another: the constant analysis of quality, especially of the sociopolitical background of

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applicants recruited, and of the number of recruits gained for particular training programs and courses of development.

From this, the appropriate conclusions must be drawn and the next tasks precisely defined. That is a condition in order that the military commands are able to give a guiding hand and thus assure recruitment that meets the requirements. With respect to early recruitment, this point deserves special attention. For example, if at the end of the ninth grade too many young men have been recruited for any given training plan and course of development, then two to three years later some of them will have to be turned down because there are not enough student slots for them. The recruits who have been prepared and oriented for years toward a military career will then experience a deep disappointment. This affects not only the person concerned, but also his relatives and circle of friends and acquaintances, already recruited applicants, and young men whom we are still trying to recruit.

Finally, it is the task of rigorous leadership to seek out the best experiences and methods, to find out what is new in daily practical work, and then to generalize them quickly. Exchange of experience has proved effective in this respect. In this way, differences still present in levels among schools or factories of various kreises as well as among kreises in a bezirk can be overcome.

The experiences of military commands and state and social organization personnel active in the recruitment effort affirm that where these requirements are met in the recruitment process, good results are achieved with minimal expenditure of funds.

Honorary Recruiting Officers

An important place in the process of recruiting a professional military is accorded honorary recruiting officers active in the general educational polytechnical and expanded secondary schools and in the factories. Their work defines the quality and quantity of recruits for the military career to a large extent. If at the outset noticeable progress was made, it was due in good part to the conscientious, responsible, and vigorous activity of these honorary officers. Still, the possibilities that arise in behalf of recruitment by use of honorary recruiting officers are not always properly utilized.

Even in the initial choice, attention must be given so that all those concerned have the prerequisites successfully to perform this socially very significant activity as recruiting officers. For example, it has proved inappropriate to use very young professional officers, ensigns (faehariche) or professional NCO's who have served only a short time, sometimes not even a year. These comrades must concentrate all their energy and

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capabilities to master their still new jobs among troops. Moreover, they frequently find themselves located for rather long periods of time outside their usual duty station. If officers and non-coms in the reserve are used as recruiting officers one should watch out that they are not overextended by their other socially-oriented obligations. And finally, the schools where the recruiting officers are located should be accessible without any great expense.

It has become evident that a growing number of reserve officers and NCO's active in the secondary schools and factories as teachers and educators have especially good qualifications for work as recruiting officers. Moreover, a study should be made to determine whether it would not make sense to utilize as recruitment officers professional officers, ensigns, and career NCO's in active service (or in the reserve) who are already involved in some honorary capacity in the schools or factories--for example, in parents organizations. Depending on the particular situation in a given area, people working as volunteers in a military command should take part in recruitment. Experience, however, confirms that it is inappropriate to use heads of military district commands, their deputies, section leaders and other district command-connected personnel whose job it is to guarantee proper leadership in the whole process of recruitment and supervise the work of those appointed as recruiting officers.

What has been said about the competence of those involved in recruitment through military district commands applies especially to the competence of recruiting officers and to working with them. Through their direct work with young people and their parents and with all the state and social forces in schools and factories, they are constantly confronted with detailed questions which come up in the process of finding a military career. Among those questions are such things as recruitment, selection, preparation and control as well as, course of development, training, demands on the applicant, aims and content of education, criteria for measuring progress, how one may be utilized, possibilities of development, financial regulations, leave, assistance on separation from active service, etc. They must be constantly informed on the current situation in the recruitment field and be provided with the materials necessary for their work. Assuring that they have this important information requires continuous and conscientious work by all military commands.

In their honorary work, recruiting officers must concentrate on solving the following problems:

1. Exerting influence toward taking concrete measures regarding professional counseling for a military career and toward a purposeful organization of this advisory activity at their school or factory.

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2. Support and execution of the measures which state representatives in the recruitment field, especially school functionaries, teachers, and educators authorize for the fulfillment of their tasks.

3. Support of and advice to the social forces in schools so that they contribute purposefully and effectively to the development of a positive attitude toward the military profession and toward the early decision by students in favor of a military career.

4. Direct support and implementation of career advisory activity among students in seventh, eighth, and ninth grades and among their parents in order to exert direct influence on students' finding and deciding on a career, on their selection and written application for a military career, mainly by the end of their ninth school year.

It is self-evident that these tasks can be fulfilled only in close cooperation with the directors, those responsible for career and study counseling, the grade leaders, the secretaries or chairmen of the SED, FDJ, and GST basic organizations, the parents organizations and their commissions.

Our experience is that concentration on these four tasks provides the best results. Tasks extending beyond these, such as for example military-political and military-athletic measures are too much for honorary recruiting officers and lead to a dissipation of their efforts.

If the recruiting officers focus above all on supporting the recruitment process, their regular work ends with exerting influence to have the young person make a written application immediately after he has made up his mind.

Naturally the recruiting officers should keep in contact afterwards as well with the confirmed and accepted applicants of their schools, in order to exert influence, if necessary on their advancement and development scholastically and professionally, in cooperation with the school administration and the district military command. This is particularly to the point inasmuch as they have a better insight into their particular school than the district military command, which must tend to a large number of establishments where it has its recruiters. This must not lead, however, to a situation in which the honorary recruiting officer takes over responsibility and the work concerned with preparing and tending to the recruits.

The recruiting officers must always bear in mind that finding a career, the decision in favor of a military career, and the future of many young men depend in an essential manner on their work.

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This work must be done conscientiously and responsibly. One must proceed with a full grasp of the facts and with realistic arguments. Every suggestion, every conversation, whether with the young man or his parents, requires conscientious preparation. Only in this way will the political and factual correctness of our statements be guaranteed. Mistakes must not be made in this. The young people must find what the school and recruiting officers told them fully confirmed later during their preparation and care in the FDJ recruitment collective and also during their further education and in their entire active military service.

The implementation of goals, content, and tasks for a forward-looking, goal-oriented, and continuous assurance of military recruitment thus places high demands on all those who bear responsibility and work together in this field.

FOOTNOTES

1. See also Lindner, P. H./Proese: "Long-term Assurance in the Field of Military Recruitment." In: MILITAERWESEN , Vol 1, 1974, p 29 ff.
2. "For a High Degree of Military Strength and Combat Readiness." From the Report of the Secretariat of the Main Political Administration of the NVA to the Ninth Delegates Conference of the SED Party Organizations in the NVA and in the Border Troops of the GDR. Speaker: Comrade Admiral Waldemar Verner. In: PARTEIARBEITER, Berlin, Special Volume 1, 1974, p 50.
3. "Communique of the Meeting of the Political Advisory Committee of the Warsaw Pact." In: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (A Edition), 19 Apr 74.
4. "Forward in the Further Realization of the Resolutions of the Eighth SED Congress. From the Report of the Politburo to the Ninth Session of the SED Central Committee. Speaker: Comrade Erich Honecker, First Secretary of the SED Central Committee. Berlin, 1973, p 43 ff.

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COMMENTARY PROVIDED ON U.S. MILITARY BASES ABROAD

East Germany MILITAERWESEN in German Oct 74 pp 82-86

[By F. Wilhelm]

/Text/ The United States has drawn a net of military bases around the world. From Greenland to the expanses of the Pacific Ocean, leathernecks are waiting for the order: "Fire at will!", airplanes stand ready on the runways, warships lie at anchor ready to put to sea.

At the 24th Party Congress, Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU, explained that American imperialism is everywhere ready "to play the role of guarantor and protective patron of the international system of exploitation and oppression. It is striving to rule everywhere, to intervene in the affairs of other nations; it unscrupulously violates their legitimate rights and sovereignty. By violence, bribery, and economic penetration, it seeks to force states and whole regions of the globe to its will."¹

The system of military bases is proof of that. It is visible proof that the most reactionary circles of American monopolistic capital have not ceased to prepare even for the military variant of the class conflict; that they have not given up their hope of blocking and rolling back socialism and its influence; that they do not want to stop intimidating the national liberation movements, to reverse their successes.

Goals and Intentions

Let us first of all look at a few facts which should throw into relief the whole scope of the military base system of the major imperialist power:

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--According to articles in the American press, as of the beginning of the '70's, the United States had established 429 large bases and almost 3,000 medium size and smaller bases in more than 30 countries.²

--According to official data, this gigantic apparatus costs the American taxpayer \$25-30 billion a year.³

--As American Defense Secretary Schlesinger announced at a press conference in November 1973, U.S. troop strength currently amounts to 2.2 million men.⁴ Data from U.S. Senator Mike Mansfield reveals that every fourth American soldier is stationed on foreign territory.⁵

--In addition to the land bases, there are the floating bases: the Sixth Fleet stationed in the Mediterranean, the Seventh Fleet cruising in the Pacific and the Fifth Fleet which is being established and is to appear mainly in the Indian Ocean.

The intentions which circles of the military-industrial complex connect with this network of military bases are expressed openly in the United States. Prof Kenneth Galbraith, one of the best-known critics of American militarism, formulated it thus: "If one has enough money and soldiers, one can guide the economic and political development of every country in the world in the desired direction."⁶

Put in a few sentences, for the American military apparatus it is mainly a matter of achieving the following goals:

--The bases are so located that clearly an attempt was undertaken to encircle the socialist countries

--They were to form a barrier against the national liberation movement.

--They bolster antipopular regimes in the most varied places in the world.

--They are intended to insure the influence of American imperialism in all areas of the non-socialist world.

As a whole the chain of military bases is an important component of the global strategy of imperialism. They are an expression of the role of the world's gendarme which the United States takes upon itself; it is the sign of the imperialist policy of world rule.

Nothing in this is changed by the fact that in recent time bases have been liquidated, that is to say, they have had to be removed. The contemporary state of military technology permits the Pentagon to give up some of the bases built in the '50's. The capitalistic countries hitherto have permitted themselves quantitative reductions in armaments only when

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they were outweighed by qualitative advances. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger himself said: "We are undertaking currently a number of changes for reasons of effectiveness--not especially in NATO--which will have no effect on our military potential."⁷

Along with that one must see that new bases have been created or planned and existing ones modernized. Only in November 1973, the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives approved \$2.6 billion which were to be invested mainly for military bases.⁸

The Distribution of Military Bases

The concept of bases of U.S. imperialism was born in World War II. It was realized more strongly after the end of the war, and American military strategy understood how to take over the bases of other countries, as for example in Great Britain. Three areas of concentration are recognizable:

1. West Europe (understood not geographically but politically), from the Mediterranean to the North Pole region.

2. The Asiatic area where in recent times the focus has been on the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

3. The Central American area, from which U.S. imperialism keeps an eye on the Caribbean Islands as well as the Latin American continent.

The imperialist conception of war pacts also concentrates on these three focal points.

But the African continent is by no means neglected. In the south, U.S. imperialism knows its influence is insured by racist regimes. In the north of the continent, Washington has been exerting itself just in recent times to strengthen its positions and to push out into the Arab area.

West Europe--the Main Point of Deployment

American monopoly capital has always devoted its greatest attention to the European area. That has not changed to this day. Even if here, under pressure of the socialist commonwealth and especially thanks to the allround strength of the Soviet Union, the process of detente has made visible progress, the reactionary circles of U.S. imperialism and its military still focus above all on Europe. At the already mentioned press conference, Defense Secretary Schlesinger gave the express assurance that he considers it important in Europe "to achieve a stronger alliance."⁹ What these words signify needs not be further defined here. What is clear is that the U.S. Senate, where armament capitalists control a strong

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faction, in June of 1974 once again rejected the withdrawal of troops from abroad by a vote of 54 to 35.¹⁰ This decision was aimed first of all against a troop reduction in West Europe. Herewith a few facts about the American presence in West Europe:

The American news magazine U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT in May 1974 placed the figure of American soldiers in the NATO countries at 260,000 men. Added thereto are 40,000 Marines with units of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.¹¹

From the same source we learn that in the FRG alone 214,000 American soldiers are stationed who have at their disposal modern weapons, including nuclear weapons.

About 400 medium range rockets of the Pershing type, whose atomic warhead can amount to between 60 and 400 kilotons are distributed among American bases in the FRG.¹²

In all, there are over 150 U.S. military bases in West Europe, 146 of them in the FRG.¹³

The total number of warheads distributed in West Europe was given as 7,200 in 1972.¹⁴

The maintenance of U.S. troops in West Europe costs American taxpayers \$440,000,000 more than their garrisoning in the United States would cost, according to Western figures.¹⁵

In addition there are the gigantic sums which must be provided by the workers of these countries. The FRG government alone planned for DM 6.6 million of so called foreign currency equalization payments in 1974 which were to pay for U.S. troop maintenance.¹⁶

There is no doubt that West Europe is the main point of deployment of international monopoly capital. It is for this reason that the Pentagon has set up most of its bases here. Here imperialism confronts socialism directly. Here the strongest anti-imperialist power exists in the form of the socialist commonwealth. In addition, there is the fact that in most of the West European capitalist states there is a well organized working class. This all underlines the strategic and political importance of this area. Thus, it suits the interests of the Pentagon obstinately to refuse to remove a single base near the central European area, above all near the flanks, the Mediterranean and North Cap. This the Icelandic Government has had to experience; it has long tried in vain to get the American troops to withdraw from the Keflavik base where 320 U.S. soldiers are stationed.¹⁷

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In the Mediterranean, too, the Pentagon defends every base; here the regime of Greek colonels, since rejected, was the most cooperative. The units stationed in the Mediterranean and in adjacent states are pointed at the same time against the African countries, where meantime the United States also maintains direct bases, for example in Morocco and Ethiopia.

The role of the United States as the Main power in NATO in the Cyprus events, in the plans for a forcible partition of the island in the interest of pulling it in more strongly as a NATO base is also beyond all doubt.

A Flanking Attempt over Asia

Even from the Asiatic area the Pentagon tries to threaten socialism, so to speak by a flanking movement. The rapid development and the great industrial significance of Siberia and the Soviet Far East is a thorn in the side of the United States. Furthermore, consideration must be given to the fact that socialism has a strong foothold in the Asiatic area, especially in the form of the Mongolian People's Republic, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the DPRK, although American imperialism tried to stop this development by brutal military force. The attack on the DPRK and above all the dirty war in Indochina were visible expression of this.

The national liberation movements in Asia, too, have strong positions; the non-capitalist path of development here has many adherents. Such influential states as India and Burma have good relations with the Soviet Union. Basically, imperialism succeeded thus far in stopping the development of a collective security system in Asia thanks only to the anti-Soviet policies of the current PRC leadership.

In addition to its strategic and political significance there is the economic importance of this part of the world. Here are natural resources which imperialism does not want to give up. Remember the petroleum deposits in the Persian Gulf, in Indonesia, and in other parts of this continent.

Finally, it must be said that with Japan, a third imperialistic center of power has come into being. For reasons of imperialist competition as well, the United States is interested in a strong presence in Asia. Along with that it simultaneously promotes the forced rearmament in Japan in order to make use of Japanese militarism.

The armed forces of a few other Asiatic regimes dependent on the United States are also drawn into the global strategy of imperialism:

--A center of the American system of military bases is Japan. Here, according to 1973 data, there are 120 bases, at which 63,000 soldiers were stationed. Plans were indeed made to reduce troop strength "without, however, reducing their material tactical striking power."¹⁸

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--A second focal point has been without doubt Thailand. Here in the fall of 1973 six bases were maintained with 45,000 American soldiers and more than 500 airplanes. Thailand was among the most important bases in the Indochina aggression. After the overthrow of the military regime in Bangkok, the Pentagon had to agree to the position of the new Thai rulers to reduce the American presence. But the B-52 squadrons were not withdrawn.¹⁹

--In Taiwan, there are three bases, which have been built as nuclear weapons bases.²⁰ In the wake of Washington's efforts to support Peking's anti-Soviet course, here, too, the engagement is to be reduced. Nevertheless, 6,000 U.S. soldiers and Air Force units, including two squadrons of fighter bombers, are supposed to remain here.²¹

--Additional bases in the Asiatic area are in the Philippines, in South Korea, in the Persian Gulf and on a whole series of islands.

All in all, it can be said that Asia is surfeited with air and marine bases, with radar stations and supply centers. The U.S. Seventh Fleet cruises constantly in Far East and South East Asian waters and sometimes has at its disposal seven aircraft carriers. Submarines equipped with Polaris missiles also belong to the Seventh Fleet.

How dangerous this deployment is for young national states is illustrated by developments in Bangladesh. When the liberation battle began here, the U.S. Seventh Fleet immediately dispatched an aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal.

One other aspect must be considered. The CIA has established camps in a series of Asian states in which, under the guidance of American officers, local soldiers are trained for counterrevolutionary attacks. That was the case in Laos, for example. Moreover, the United States supported antipopular regimes by comprehensive arms deliveries. Thus, it is only thanks to these weapons deliveries that the Saigon regime can maintain itself. In recent times the Pentagon has intensified its efforts to set up new bases in Asia and Oceania:

--A marine base is to be established on the island of Diego Garcia, which is under British control, at a cost of \$32.2 million.²² An airfield with a take-off and landing strip of 4000 meters is to make it possible to use heavy transport planes and B-52 strategic bombers.²³

--Plans are also becoming public according to which the number of bases in the Pacific is to be increased and according to which the Marianas chain of islands is to be annexed to the United States for "defense purposes."²⁴

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--Finally, it must be mentioned in this context that the Pentagon obstinately refuses to dismantle its radar spider net built on Australia's North West Cape. This huge U.S. Naval radio station, covering four square kilometers, controls all fleet units, including the Polaris submarines, operating in the southeast Asian area and in the Indian Ocean.²⁵

The U.S. policy of military bases in the Asiatic area, especially the plans in the Indian Ocean, are provoking increasing protest. They represent not only a danger to the Asiatic countries, but are directed at the same time against progressive countries, especially on the east coast of Africa.

Watch Dog in Front of Latin America's Door

In the worldwide class conflict between the three revolutionary mainstreams and imperialism, Latin America is playing an increasingly important role. Here the demand is getting louder and louder to become free of the tutelage and suppression by U.S. imperialism. After Washington has for decades been able to do as it pleased according to its own discretion in this area, it finds itself in recent years up against a growing anti-imperialist movement. U.S. imperialism can still find support, however, from a few regimes, which came to power with its help, or which can maintain themselves in power only with U.S. help and are in reality governors under U.S. monopoly companies.²⁶

The development in Cuba, especially, is a thorn in the side of American imperialism. It has never become reconciled to the fact that socialism is being successfully built here, and it seeks with all its strength to prevent Cuba from being an example to others.

The Pentagon has located its system of military bases on the American continent in such a way that highly mobile units can attack in the shortest possible time at all places of the continent and carry out the interests of monopoly capital--something that is repeatedly practiced. The network of bases therefore is concentrated in the Central American area.

U.S. bases are located in 17 Latin American countries.²⁷

Their command headquarters, the Southern Command, is in the Panama Canal Zone, where up to 30,000 U.S. soldiers are stationed at more than 20 bases.²⁸

Other bases are in Colombia, Bolivia, Guatemala, and other countries.²⁹

The Guantanamo base at the southeast tip of Cuba is directed against the socialist development in Cuba.

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So one can say that U.S. imperialism also seeks to maintain its claim to hegemony in Latin America by means of its bases. Here too, it does not shy away from recklessly using military power, as the events in Chile once more prove.

An Obstacle to Peace

Thanks to the constantly growing influence of socialism and its strength, the detente process has recently made indubitable progress. It has succeeded in lowering the danger of war in Europe, and in extinguishing the fires of war in the Near East and Asia. The system of military bases of the United States, which is supplemented by bases of other imperialist countries and by military pacts, has not been able to stop the trend in the power relationship. But it still poses a constant threat to peace. It shows that reactionary circles of American monopoly capital standing behind the Pentagon continue to be ready and in the position to undertake new military adventures.

The chronology of armed imperialist aggression from 1945 to the present is long.³⁰ In almost all the wars, attacks, and counterrevolutionary actions which imperialist countries unleashed or led in recent years, the system of military bases played an extraordinary role. For this reason the demand for the elimination of foreign military bases is one of the essential points of the peace program of the 24th CPSU Congress.³¹

The military base policy is also an outstanding expression of the aggressiveness of imperialism. That we must always bear in mind and always take into consideration in our military policy.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Rechenschaftsbericht des Zentralkomitees der KPdSU an den XXIV. Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion" (Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th CPSU Congress). Speaker: L. I. Brezhnev. Moscow/Berlin, 1971, p 22.
2. See NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (A Edition), 20 Feb 73.
3. Ibid.
4. See ADN Information, Berlin, 6 Dec 73.
5. See ADN, Berlin, 7 Jun 74.
6. DER SPIEGEL, Hamburg, 30 Sep 69.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

7. ADN Information (loc. cit.).
8. See NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (loc. cit.), 15 Nov 73.
9. ADN Information (loc. cit.).
10. See ADN (loc. cit.), 7 Jun 74.
11. Ibid., 4 Jun 74.
12. See DER STERN, Hamburg, 14 Feb 74.
13. See HORIZONT, Berlin, No 21, 1971.
14. See NEUE ZEIT (New Times), Moscow, No 9, 1972.
15. See FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, Frankfurt/Main, 18 Aug 73.
16. See DIE TAT, Frankfurt/Main, 20 Apr 74.
17. See FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, Frankfurt/Main, 25 Mar 74.
18. Frankfurter RUNDSCHAU (loc. cit.), 22 Feb 73.
19. See TAGESSPIEGEL, West Berlin, 7 Sep 73.
20. See NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (loc. cit.), 20 Feb 73.
21. See TAGESSPIEGEL (loc. cit.).
22. See SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Munich, 22 Mar 74.
23. See NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (loc. cit.), 14 Mar 74.
24. Ibid., 15 Jul 74.
25. See FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU (loc. cit.), 5 Jan 74.
26. See F. Wilhelm, "The Military Intrigues of U.S. Imperialism in Latin America." In MILITAERWESEN, Berlin, Vol 5, 1974, p 71 ff.
27. See ADN (loc. cit.), 28 Sep 73.
28. See IPW BERICHTS, Berlin, Vol 5, 1973, p 68.
29. See ADN (loc. cit.), 28 Sep 73.

30. See H. Rennhack, "Chronology of Armed Imperialist Aggression Since 1945." In MILITAERWESEN ; (loc. cit.) Vol 3-5, 1974.
31. See "Rechenschaftsbericht des Zentralkomitees der Kommunistischen Partei des Sowjetunion" (Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), loc. cit., p 41.

MUNITION SUPPLY OF BATTALIONS DISCUSSED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Oct 74 pp 103A-106A

[By Col A. Rippa, engineer]

/Text/ Modern combat and the methods of its conduct place great demands on the rear services and bring about new requirements for the support of troops from the rear, which are barely comparable with those of past wars. In the voluminous memoirs of the Soviet military leaders of the Great Fatherland War, the significant influence of continuous, timely and complete rear support on the successful prosecution of combat is thoroughly described. Furnishing ammunition to the troops as part of rear support is included in materiel support. Provision of ammunition is one of the main types of supply.

Consumption Rates

Combat support (of battalion troops) with ammunition is conducted on the basis of the combat mission of the battalion. The anticipated average consumption of ammunition constitutes the basis, which is expressed in rates of consumption.

Rates of consumption represent the average total expenditure of ammunition, expressed in rounds or in units of fire, depending on the type which is required for the combat mission with consideration for the degree of intensity of combat (pin-down or destroy). Necessarily, it must be anticipated that the rates of consumption will vary depending on the combat mission and the type of combat, or that the specifics of the impending combat role will influence the volume of the consumption rate of the various kinds of ammunition.

Rates of consumption are set for a day, or a stage specifically limited by a period of time or a locale. They can be keyed to the mission, for example in the case of artillery ammunition, on the proportions of the consumption rate which are planned (or foreseen) for the artillery preparation, support or accompaniment.

The extent of the ammunition support of an MSB/PB (motorized rifle battalion/tank battalion) is determined not only by the predetermined rate of consumption, but also by the extent of the available reserves in the unit after the accomplishment of the mission ordered. Accordingly, the available troop stocks in the units frequently must be replenished, especially during preparatory fires and in the course of the attack.

Supply Methods

Determination of the ammunition supply required (with consideration of the battalion's normal units of fire) is encumbant on the senior officer for ordnance. He organizes its provision with his personnel and resources, in close cooperation with the elements of the higher formation's rear services.

The selection of the proper method of ammunition supply for the units of the formation depends on various factors. Of extraordinary significance here is the order of battle already assumed or foreseen. Furthermore, within the formation, there will be varying degrees of urgency for issuance to the individual units, based on their missions. Along with this, methods of supply depend on the amounts and types of ammunition that must be provided, feasibility and prerequisites of conducting the supplying and the time available for effecting supply measures.

Among the factors which influence the choice of methods of supply are:

- the length and condition of the supply routes and paths,
- possible hostile intervention,
- the time of day and the season,
- the nature of the terrain at hand,
- the KC (ABC) situation,
- the way in which the ammunition is packed and its arrangement in ammunition loads, on pallets or in packets,
- breaking down the ammunition according to type and caliber,
- last but not least, the attack tempo of the troops (for example in offensive operations).

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Ammunition provided to troops must be ready to fire and faultlessly packaged. It cannot possess any technical or maintenance deficiencies which would prevent its being fired. During transport and during issuance/acceptance, one must take care that the ammunition is not subjected to any kind of stress which could damage it or make it unusable. The safety regulations applying to handling and transporting ammunition must be strictly observed. Among other things, that requires that the means of transport foreseen for the ammunition be in perfect condition, technically and with respect to maintenance.

The provision of the directed (planned) amounts and types of ammunition to the battalions is carried out for the most part with the personnel and resources of the higher formation. Here it must be pointed out that often supply activities include other forms of support and the individual vehicles are combined into supply columns. In setting up the supply column, every effort must be made from the beginning to avoid having to maneuver the supplies around in order to achieve proper distribution, by type and amount, to the units, and to see that supply requires only a minimum of time and road space.

The immediate destination of the supply column is the MSB/PB reception point, as directed by the higher formation, and precisely located in agreement with the battalion chief of staff. For a quick and smooth course of operation at the reception point, it is necessary that the battalion be informed in a timely manner as to when the supply column will arrive and what materiel in what quantities (in what amount) is being provided. If necessary, or under proper conditions of combat and position, for example when the battalion is in the defense or all units are concentrated in one area, personnel and resources of the battalion can also be detailed to pick up materiel, upon the decision of the formation commander.

Acceptance of Ammunition in the Battalion

Measures for ammunition support which the battalion must organize go into effect with the arrival of the supply column at the reception point. In the battalion, the chief of staff plans and organizes these. He determines the amount, the order (sequence) and the schedule for supply of ammunition to the units, based on the decision of the battalion commander for the organization of materiel support. It is also incumbent upon him to instruct the persons carrying it out, and to check on the fulfillment of orders and directives given.

At the proper time a guide is posted at the battalion reception point. He is instructed exactly by the chief of staff on the amounts, sequence and all of the other tasks related to the supply of materiel to the units.

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After the arrival of the supply column, the vehicles are pulled out of the column, on which the materiel is loaded for the first company/battery ordered to be supplied. This is done with consideration for the types and amounts of ammunition as well as for other types of supplies (in almost all cases, several other types of supplies are issued simultaneously). The guide directs these vehicles to the collection point, or to a pre-determined company/battery turnover point.

The other vehicles of the supply column move into a waiting area until called. This area must offer a covered and secure space for several vehicles with maintenance of the required tactical intervals as well as having entry and exit trails available. Often the selected area is in the vicinity of the observation post of the battalion commander.

The sequential supply of units and timely recall of vehicles out of the waiting area at different intervals proves to be appropriate when the units affected must be relieved in combat for the purpose of materiel supply. Then, the issuance of ammunition as well as motor fuel occurs simultaneously.

If the supply of the MSB/PB occurs, for example, during the preparation for attack, then it is possible to disperse the supply column directly to the units and not have them occupy a waiting area first. In this case, the waiting area is used to assemble the empty vehicles of the supply column. With attention to the order of battle that has been taken up by the battalion, supply of materiel can ensue by company/battery as well as by platoon. In this case, various routes and times are used by the individual vehicles of the supply column. After completion of the materiel supply of the MSB/PB, empty vehicles of the supply column move together to their billeting area at the higher formation. Under such conditions, the transit time of transportation resources of the formation is relatively short. If necessary, the empty transport is used to carry back wounded from the battalion aid station, and/or to evacuate unneeded (disabled, damaged) weapons, empty casings, packing material and so forth.

Acceptance of the Ammunition in the Company/Battery

The first sergeant is responsible for the reception, acceptance and authentication of ammunition in the company/battery. On the basis of instructions from the company/battery commander he must organize the issuance of ammunition to the platoons or directly to personnel of the company/battery, and must take care of its economical consumption and best possible utilization. When, for example during defensive operations, an ammunition point is set up in the company on instructions from the company commander, the first sergeant has the duty of running it. He must also see to it that along with its covered and secure storage, prepared ammunition is not stored or transported together with unprocessed

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ammunition. Captured ammunition must likewise be stored separately from the other ammunition, and like unprocessed ammunition, must be reported to the formation.

If extra stocks of ammunition are to be provided to the units, for example for the participation of mortars and other weapons in the artillery bombardment, or within the framework of defensive battle, part of this ammunition can be stocked on the ground, because in these cases the transport capability of the company/battery is not sufficient. In the case of mortars, this will involve for the most part ammunition to be fired during the artillery bombardment. For tanks which are to participate in the artillery bombardment, it is advantageous to stock the unit of fire ammunition on the ground, and to load up the tanks with the ammunition foreseen for the fire mission during the artillery bombardment. At the end of the participation of tanks in the artillery bombardment, they are loaded up with the unit of fire ammunition, thereby guaranteeing that they will have their full fire power at the time of their introduction into the attack.

Issuance of Ammunition to Combat Vehicles During Battle

Supply of units with ammunition immediately becomes more complicated if stocks of combat equipment must be replenished during battle. For that the following possibilities have worked out to be useful. In general, they can be assumed to be known already, however for the sake of completeness they are listed again:

In the case of favorable terrain conditions, transport vehicles with ammunition can move under cover into the battle positions of tanks and SPW (SPz) /APC's/. The combat vehicles hold up in their forward movement individually (refueling can proceed at the same time). Such supply is possible only when very good natural cover is available and it is used skillfully to avoid enemy fire to the greatest extent possible. Usually, the first sergeant is charged with issuing ammunition to the motorized riflemen at the same time. He undertakes the further distribution. This variation should be selected only when the aforementioned prerequisites apply, or hostile resistance has already been broken.

If the terrain and the progress of the battle do not allow the type of supply described above, transport vehicles with ammunition are brought up to a company transfer point, which should be located about 1000 meters behind the forward line of troops. Depending on the battle situation, one or two combat vehicles are drawn out of the line of battle, resupplied with ammunition, and put back into the line, and then the next combat vehicle is pulled out.

Furthermore, it is possible to have the transport vehicles with ammunition draw up to a covered area which can be up to 2000 meters behind the forward

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line of troops. Upon the order of the company commander, single APC's, which have been pulled back from the battle line and loaded up with ammunition, pick up the ammunition for one or several APC's or tanks and distribute it directly at the battle front.

Manual transport of ammunition from the turnover point to the units and combat equipment is also possible. Further variations can be applied and combined with each other.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize again that the supply of ammunition to combat vehicles is almost always paired with filling them with motor fuel. Supply of ammunition is always regarded as only part of the task, within total materiel support of the MSB/PB.

Successful materiel support of an MSB/PB depends substantially on exact organization and on close collaboration between the rear services of the formation and the personnel in the battalions responsible for materiel support.

Organization of materiel support, collaboration among personnel and the methods of supply are decisive criteria for uninterrupted, timely and sufficient materiel support, and hence likewise for the resolution of combat tasks by the MSB/PB. Therefore today, our total vigilance must likewise be directed toward effective preparation of units for materiel support in combat.

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ADVANTAGES OF JOINT SOVIET-GDR OFFICER TRAINING DESCRIBED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Oct 74 pp 102B-103B

[By Maj W. Engelstaedter, engineer]

/Text/ Brotherhood-in-arms, which in recent years has been further developed and strengthened among their armies, has played a significant role in the successful military-political balance of the socialist community of states.

For us members of the National People's Army (NVA), close alliance with the Soviet Army is an international need and at the same time is a necessity arising out of the nature of common military tasks as well as the armed struggle.

Comrade Admiral Verner stated in the report of the Secretariat of the Political Main Administration of the NVA to the Ninth Delegates Conference of the SED Organizations in the NVA and border troops: "We note daily that brotherhood-in-arms with the Soviet Army has become a matter of heart and soldier routine. Our warm combat greeting is extended to our Soviet brothers-in-arms, whom we assure that we will always work hand in hand with the 'regiment nextdoor,' and that we will, in the spirit of Ernst Thaelmann, learn from the Soviet Union and its glorious armed forces how to fight and win."¹

We too have assembled valuable experience in the most varied areas during the realization of socialist brotherhood. Particularly fruitful cooperation developed between the members of the Titscher Section of the Franz Mehring Officers' Academy and the members of a Soviet Training Center.

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Student officers have more than once completed military-technical training in fighter piloting in this GSFG (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany) garrison. Under the guardianship of experienced Soviet specialists, they apply their acquired theoretical knowledge, and train, with regard to the newest practical techniques, and strengthen their skills in modern fighter piloting.

For future leaders, military-technical training in the Soviet training center has proven itself to be one of the most effective forms of training possible, because here, the most diverse factors operate in a comprehensive manner.

The substantive-technical side of the training is effected under the following conditions: After the future pilot/flight leaders have acquired their first practical experience in troop work and in a training and simulator apparatus for the presentation of situations in the air (target impulses), their practical training starts at the Soviet training center. Here, the total simulation of traditional and automated fighter flying is possible, using flight simulators. Student officers practice all elements of fighter piloting which they must cope with during their later assignment to combat units under simulated combat conditions. Therefore, they are already trained at the officers' academy on the apparatus and under the operational-tactical conditions, which they will come across in their military practice.

How is Fighter Piloting Organized in the Soviet Training Center?

Soviet pilots are directed in flight simulators by student officers by means of radar simulators, and "fly" according to their directional commands. Every interception process is documented. Thereby, the methodical, or navigational-tactical approach and the practicality of the actions of the student officers at the screens can be analyzed exactly. This comprehensive documentation, which has been worked out with attention to actual simulated combat conditions, permits an objective check on every simulated interception flight.

What always impresses student officers in their joint effort at the Soviet training center, are the cordiality and hospitality with which they are accepted and taken care of by their Soviet brothers-in-arms, along with the patience and untiring readiness with which the Soviet specialists support the student officers.

Our student officers always render great praise to the training itself, the form and methods of instruction and the development of skills in serving and effective operation of the most modern equipment. This is not to ignore the strictly organized schedule which runs like clockwork based on exemplary discipline and order as well as because of the high

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degree of responsibility-consciousness of every soldier, sergeant and officer regarding the total mission of the collective. Many student officers experience brotherhood-in-arms in military routine for the first time. To be sure, they have discussed the concept of "socialist internationalism" theoretically in social-scientific training, but now they recognize the great demand that socialist internationalism puts on each one of us in the military sector. Thereby the conviction is deepened within them that inviolable brotherhood-in-arms with the Soviet Army represents an inseparable component of socialist internationalism.

Diverse factors during joint training have a positive influence on educating student officers into being class-conscious and highly qualified military specialists.

For example, there is direct cooperation with Soviet soldier companions.

The student officers sense communality of concept in regard to basic political and societal problems. Stable, unshakable convictions, well-founded knowledge and military expertise characterize the personality of members of the Soviet Army. To identify themselves with them in social-political concepts and actions, is a need for each and every student officer and instructor officer in our section. Realization that Soviet soldiers are politically conscious, well trained and dependable companions-in-arms and friends, is strengthened more and more through personal experience and through the close and many-sided contacts the student officers have with members of the Soviet Army.

Technical perfection and near-reality in training have an extremely favorable effect.

To be an equal brother-in-arms to Soviet soldiers obligates one to achievement of the highest degree of military expertise. Only if this requirement is carried through precisely, are our troops capable of fulfilling the complicated tasks set by modern fighter flight on today's student officer and future pilot personnel, side by side with our Soviet comrades.

Concurrently enthusiasm is awakened and justifiable pride is evoked in them over their capability of mastering this modern Soviet technology. Not the least, the conviction grows out of it of the superiority of Soviet weapons and combat equipment and the invincibility of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact.

Joint training permits comparisons, motivates, and makes possible, with the example of Soviet troops, the inculcation of such attributes and conduct as:

--the right attitude and complete confidence in the equipment;

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- aspiration for a high degree of technical knowledge and ability;
- unconditional discipline, absolute dependability and pronounced responsibility-consciousness;
- a high degree of psychological and physical endurance;
- efficient use of training time;
- conscientious maintenance of equipment;
- economical consumption of material resources.

Student officers comprehend the necessity of mastering the Russian language.

Because the uniform command language of the armies united in the Warsaw Pact is Russian, all necessary directions and commands are given in Russian, starting in training. This means that not only the Soviet pilots, but also the student officers give all commands in Russian in the directional process. But conversation is carried on not only during training itself; the student officers use every opportunity that presents itself to develop language skills, be it in personal conversation, political forums, shop talk or in joint organization of free time.

Striving for the best possible results during training as well as the desire to learn more about the Soviet Army, life in the Soviet Union and about the combat companion, doubtlessly has motivated many student officers of the third course to take language proficiency tests Ia and IIa. This was not without results. That was proven by student officers of the Titscher Section during the competition in Russian held at the officers' academy. Sixty percent of the participants were from this section; they took all of the top positions.

Personal attachments have developed. Collaboration during training exercises, many personal contacts and fraternal ties deepen mutual respect, consolidate unshakable confidence in each other on both sides and strengthen international feelings and actions of all participants.

Frequently friendships develop on the basis of close and many-sided contacts which continue after the completion of training at the officer's academy.

Experience proves that encounters with seasoned Soviet comrades are not only a special experience for the young student officers, but also exert a lasting emotional-educational influence over them. They strengthen the student officers in their will to be exemplary champions for German-Soviet friendship and dependable combat companions of our fraternally-united

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Soviet Army. The student officers proved that to the Soviet instructors during the end of course examinations when they came up with "good" and "very good" performances.

The formalization of a sponsorship pact between the two units on the occasion of the 1972 NVA Day took shape as a high point of brotherhood-in-arms. The manifold forms of collaboration laid down in it open up significant possibilities for raising the effectiveness of political-ideological effort and for achieving excellent results in the combat training of the student officers. For the student officers, it is a duty to prepare themselves conscientiously for daily training and to master the commands and messages in Russian. Our Soviet friends saw their duty above all to convey the most recent experience factors on flying fighters.

There is no doubt that this realistic training contributes significantly to increasing the combat effectiveness of the fighter pilots. That was proven by the graduates from the previous year. Many of the young lieutenants were in the position to meet the high demands of combat training within a short time after their assignments to the troops. The practical experiences which they had already acquired as student officers at the Soviet training center comprised one of the most important prerequisites for this. But the trainers and instructors of the section also became richer in experience, and can surely use important methodological and didactic theories of the Soviet comrades in their work.

The close ties to the Soviet sponsoring unit promote the feeling of solidarity and help the student officers to better conceive of their responsibility vis-a-vis the socialist community of states and to meet it consequently.

FOOTNOTE

1. Quoted from the Report of the Secretariat of the Political Main Administration of the NVA to the Ninth Delegates Conference of the Party Organization of the SED in the National People's Army and the Border Troops of the GDR, from PARTEIARBEITER (East Berlin), Special Edition on the Ninth Delegates Conference, 1974, p 25.

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PROBLEMS IN RADAR MAINTENANCE CITED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Oct 74 pp 108B-110B

[By Lt Col S. Mett, engineer]

/Text/ Range is one of the basic tactical parameters of the radar station. Therefore it is an urgent requirement of its operation to assure that the range is in accordance with the technical capabilities of the radar station at hand. This requirement however can be resolved only when reliable data about the range can be obtained.

In this article, possibilities for checking the range will be listed and tips will be given as to which method is required and is feasible in certain situations.

Even now there is no uniform method for checking range which is objective and reliable under all circumstances. The following methods are known:

- direct measurement of the distance to the object (target);
- measurement of the amplitude of a fixed target;
- measurement with the aid of a standard reflector;
- measurement of the technical parameters of the radar station, upon which the range depends;
- measurement with the aid of a control resonator or with a running-time chain.

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Direct Measurement of Distance

In this method, the distance to an aircraft on fixed radar flights, or on coincidental test flights, is measured directly. In doing this however, a number of substantial shortcomings crop up. Systematic checking of the station in this method entails a great expenditure of time and resources. Range of a radar station depends on the propagation of electromagnetic waves. Therefore it must be tested under normal conditions of propagation. Also, the actual reflecting surface of the target has an effect at the interception point, which effect depends on the construction and course of the target. For this reason range must be measured with one and the same target, on the same course. This requirement makes measurement very difficult. Often one cannot apply this method because it must be understood at the activation of the station that it has the required range.

The results of distance-to-the-target measurement depend therefore on many factors, which may change substantially and which are not influenced by the technical condition of the radar station. Range cannot be checked constantly during operation using the method described, and above all, one cannot determine the cause of a possible reduction in range. Therefore, this method for checking range while in operation is unsuitable.

Measurement of the Amplitude of a Fixed Target

Within the radar station's interception zone, there can be fixed targets which are clearly observed as single targets on the sighting device of the station. These can be towers, chimneys or other objects which extend upward. Often it is assumed that one can judge a station's deviation in range, if one measures the amplitude of the signals reflected from these fixed targets and compares values measured at different times. This is not correct! The amplitude of the signal does not depend solely on the parameters of the station, rather also on the propagation conditions of electromagnetic waves and from the interference phenomena at the local objects (fixed targets at which no interference phenomena have been observed are rare).

In addition, the amplitude of the signal can be measured only with limited accuracy. Often, changed propagation limits of electromagnetic waves lead to a reduction in the amplitude of a fixed target signal. The false impression is aroused that the range of the station has lessened. Adjustment of the station would lead to its maladjustment, because of which the range actually would be reduced. For the reasons cited, this method of checking range while in operation is inappropriate.

Measurement with the Aid of a Standard Reflector

The essence of this method is the estimation of a radar station's range based on a signal reflected from a "standard target" set up a short distance

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away. A standard reflector may be utilized as such a target. This reflector is set up in the vicinity of the station. Thereby the propagation conditions of the electromagnetic waves have practically no influence on the intensity of the reflected signals. The reflected signal, in its amplitude, is much stronger than the receiver noise. However the difficulty arises that the value of the signal cannot be determined exactly because it is limited due to overamplification of the receiver. The intensity of the signals emitted, and hence, the signals reflected and received, must therefore be reduced. This is done with attenuators built into the corresponding circuit of the radar station. They lower the output which goes from transmitter to antenna and from the antenna to the receiver. In this manner the energy potential of the station is artificially lowered, and the reflected signal is regulated back to the level of the receiver noise. The extent of attenuation applied during this regulation process depicts the effectiveness of the station. Among the advantages of this range checking method is the almost total freedom from the propagation limitations of electromagnetic waves. A definite disadvantage is the necessity to build in a high performance attenuator in the high frequency circuit of the radar station.

Measurement of Technical Parameters

With the aid of measuring devices, the technical parameters on which range depends are measured. Prerequisite for such measurement are measuring devices with the necessary degree of accuracy and corresponding connecting elements to the radar station.

This method has the following advantages:

--Range checking requires no fly-by of aircraft.

--Measurements are not subject to the propagation limitations of electromagnetic waves.

--Technical parameters can be measured without transmitting electromagnetic energy into space.

--It is possible during operation to determine the worsening of the technical parameters in a timely manner, and to initiate maintenance measures to raise the parameters to their normal value.

--It is possible to check the technical condition and the accuracy of the synchronization of all elements which affect range. Thereby those factors can be isolated which have lead to the reduction of range.

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

The disadvantages of this method are:

--Many special measuring devices are required.

--Much time is required for measurement.

These disadvantages can be eliminated to a great extent, in radar equipment already in use, through wide use of built-in measuring devices. For that reason, this method became the chief method for range checking.

Measurement with the Aid of a Checking Resonator or a Running-time Chain

The range of a radar station can be checked with a checking resonator or a running-time chain. The checking resonator can be built into the station or be available as auxiliary equipment. With it, it is possible to ascertain the quality of the work of the station by approximation.

The running-time chain is attached to the antenna circuit through an attenuator. A periodic reflection of the impulse formed by the transmitter is produced. Each time when the short circuited running-time chain impulse reaches its threshold again, a part of its energy ends up in the receiving circuit. Thereby one can observe measuring impulses on a viewer with linear control. The number of impulses gives indirect indication of the range of the station. The functioning of the measuring method with a checking resonator is similar. In both cases, a control signal is fed into the receiving circuit of the station, the parameters of which are determined by the transmitting impulse. At the terminal of the receiving circuit, the range of the radar station can be checked indirectly by comparing the test signals with the receiver noise. Both methods are not yet used in the radio-technical detachments but are acquiring significance. Their advantage is the simplicity of the measuring method and their constructive resolution. A substantial disadvantage is that accuracy is not very great. From the preceding, it can be seen that measurement of the technical parameters, on which range depends, guarantees the best check of radar equipment range under troop conditions. Exact analysis of the dependence of range on individual technical parameters shows that systematic measurement of the following technical parameters makes a reliable assertion about radar range possible:

--The sensitivity of the receiving circuit or the signal-distortion relationship;

--The output of the transmitter;

--The frequency spectrum of the transmitting impulse (especially with magnetron generators);

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

--Attenuation in the antenna lead;

--The constant wave relationship of the antenna lead.

Also, the functional accuracy of the automatic frequency adjustment must definitely be checked constantly.

The above-listed possibilities for effective checking of this important tactical parameter of radar stations recognize the great responsibility borne by station crews for regular and constant checking. Systematic planning for checking this parameter and other technical parameters, and carrying it out with a high degree of quality has more and more become an important leadership task for supervisors at all levels and for the organs of the radar engineer service.

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FRG VIOLATIONS OF COASTAL WATERS CITED

East Berlin MILITAERWESSEN in German Oct 74 pp 98C-103C

[By Rear Admiral H. Jordt]

/Excerpt/ Despite the conclusion of the basic treaty between both German states, the situation on the maritime borders is particularly characterized by increased operational activity of surface and aerial units of the Federal border defense naval arm within the territorial waters of the GDR, by an increase in the number of infringements of our territorial waters by pleasure boats and fishing vessels of the FRG, and by organized provocations against our border protection vessels. Said in another way: considerable efforts are being made by reactionary forces of the FRG to cause continuous disorder on the maritime borders of the GDR.

Violations of the territorial waters of our Republic increased 45 percent during the training year 1972-1973, as compared with 1971-1972. Comrades in the Coastal Border Brigade were subjected repeatedly to real tests of their political reliability by these things in the course of performing their duties.

Some of the boat crews that violated our maritime borders are lectured about their illegal actions, about the existence and extent of the territorial waters of the GDR, and then turned back out on the open seas. But incorrigible boat crews perpetrating fishing robberies within the territorial waters, provoking the border security forces and calumniating the GDR are gathered up in uncompromising fashion and made to answer for their behavior in conformity with our laws.

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A few peculiarities which must be kept in mind for maintaining border security without any breaches, and which make extremely high demands on the alertness and readiness for action of the personnel engaged in this work, are a result of the natural geographical conditions in the coastal area. In recent years the Baltic Sea coast, as is well known, was built up and developed into the most important recreation center of our republic, where in 1965 some 3 million and in 1972 some 10 million vacationers and weekend tourists from inside the country and from abroad stopped. In 1974 it is already 13 million vacationers and tourists who are on the move in the coastal area. In addition there is the permanent international and national navigational traffic, international passenger and freight traffic via ferry connections, and the heavy traffic of coastal and Baltic Sea fishing vessels which has to be processed through by the Coastal Border Brigade, as well as the pleasure boat traffic in its entirety both within and outside territorial waters.

The initiation of diplomatic relations between the GDR and Sweden, 21 December 1972, and between the GDR and Denmark, 12 January 1973, resulted in the activation of traffic over the traditional ferry connections of Sassnitz-Trelleborg and Warnemuende-Gedser. For example, more than 55 percent of the goods moving between the continent and Norway-Sweden on railroad floating bridges use the Sassnitz-Trelleborg route. Growing out of the ever increasing pleasure boat traffic, the Coastal Border Brigade faces the task during summer months of processing through up to 1,350 pleasure boats per 24-hour period.

In view of the conditions of development in giving shape to developed socialist society in the GDR, and of the continuously sharper tension of class confrontation with imperialism, and of the concrete situation on the maritime border, there arise ever higher demands on the consciousness of our sailors, non-commissioned officers and officers. First of all the border man must know what and whom he has to defend, who his class brother is, and who his class enemy. This is the fundamental precondition whereby friend can be distinguished from foe, clearly and uncompromisingly, in every situation in daily border service. It is also a matter of having our comrades understand that their commitment in the daily defense of the border is in every instance an internationalist class responsibility. For this reason we pay very particular attention to further strengthening friendship and comradeship in arms with our Soviet and Polish comrades.

As a consequence of the direct cooperation of the Coastal Border Brigade with various Soviet and Polish units, comradeship in arms is becoming ever stronger for the personnel engaged in this work. It has already developed into a very good tradition that these relations do not extend just to service matters, but that the comrades of our units are getting to know one another ever more closely also in the many joint social and sporting events. This extends to enduring family contacts.

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the GDR, of the 30th anniversary of the Polish People's Republic, and of the preparations for the 30th anniversary of the liberation from fascism, we are able to say with pride that friendship and cooperation with our Soviet and Polish comrades in arms has grown continuously stronger and deeper. It has been demonstrated over and over again in daily practical experience that there is nothing which divides us, but that everything binds us more strongly together.

We also know, however, that imperialism has not changed its nature in any way despite the intensive efforts at detente by the socialist community of states, and despite obvious successes in the implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence. For this reason, working up a real image of the enemy occupies a key place in the political-ideological educational work of our unit. Reality proves that every member of the Coastal Border Brigade must reckon with the use of force by those involved in attempts to violate the maritime borders of the GDR. The necessity can thus arise for him of having to make thoroughgoing use of his firearms also in protecting maritime borders.

The members of our unit, a majority of whom are young men without any experience in class struggle, today understand very well how to distinguish between friend and foe in daily border service.

And because the reliable accomplishment of our battle assignment depends in the last analysis upon the consciousness of our comrades, all commanders, political organs and party and FDJ organizations are guided by this consideration, to develop ever more strongly the readiness and the will of all members to prevent, to the extreme, every enemy of our state from carrying out his plans on the maritime borders.

And still another important political-ideological issue should be specified: working with the border population. The continuous strengthening of the connection and cooperation with party and state organs of the kreises, with party organizations, mayors, section agents of the People's Police, schools, fishery production cooperatives, enterprises, mass organizations and citizens of the border communities is an inseparable component part of our struggle for the reliable protection of the maritime borders and therewith for the fulfillment of the principal military task which has been assigned to us.

Successful cooperation was and is essentially determined by the attitude of our comrades in the border area. The better we distinguish ourselves by model discipline and order, the more resolutely we accomplish our tasks and guarantee security in the border area, just that much more rapidly will there develop among all strata of our population a willingness to support the border security forces.

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

The forms and methods of cooperation are very many-sided. They begin with joint cultural and sporting events, with clarification of current political questions, and extend via the collaboration of regimental officers in state and social organs of the kreises and border communities, to direct support for daily border defense by the border population.

The development of the Coastal Border Brigade proves that the assignment made by the party and of the leaders of the state, to reliably protect the maritime borders of the GDR against all imperialist assaults, has been correctly understood by us and fulfilled with rich deployment of initiatives. The visible increase in the fighting strength of the party organizations, the further implementation of the leading role of the party in all areas of social life, and the consolidation and strengthening of our combat collectives constituted basic precondition for this.

The successes attained of course make us optimistic, but they are still no reason for self-satisfaction.

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FIGURES PROVIDED ON CEMA MERCHANT FLEET ACTIVITIES

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Oct 74 pp 104C-108C

[By Naval Capt Dr. K. Baerwinkel]

/Text/ At the most recent session of the Political Advisory Committee of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, April 1974, a positive balance was drawn up of the universal cooperation of the fraternal socialist states. The communique reads:

"The participants in the meeting emphasize with satisfaction the further development of the universal cooperation of the fraternal states, which is accelerating the growth of economic potential, strengthening the capacity for unification of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, and contributing to increased prosperity of the peoples and the development of culture and science."¹

This evaluation of the successful development of socialism is also true for CEMA maritime navigation, which is strengthening economic potential and contributing to the accomplishment of the principal tasks set by the socialist states.

Successful Results of CEMA Maritime Navigation

Maritime navigation can point to successful development during the 25-year history of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance /CEMA/. This is to be seen from the increasing quantities of freight transported by CEMA maritime navigation (in million tons):²

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	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1972</u>
Bulgaria	0.3	1.1	14.5	15.9
GDR	---	1.4	8.5	10.3
Cuba	---	1.0	2.1	3.2
Poland	2.5	6.0	17.6	21.5
Romania	0.2	0.2	4.4	5.2
CSSR	---	0.5	0.9	0.9
USSR	33.7	75.9	161.9	178.0
Hungary	---	0.1	0.4	0.5
CEMA Total	36.7	86.2	210.3	235.5

Maritime transport performed by CEMA countries thus rose more than six-fold during 22 years. As a consequence of this development it was possible to reach goals set for foreign trade and also to establish the socialist foreign trade monopoly. Here it must be taken into consideration that the CEMA states, with the exception of Cuba, as a result of their geographic situation have control over an integrated territory and that a large portion of all transport is overland. In conformity with the varying territorial conditions, the share of maritime transport as a percentage of total transport by countries was as follows:³

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1972</u>
Bulgaria	23.0	67.1	61.8
GDR	21.9	57.3	55.5
Cuba	----	----	66.5
Poland	33.6	48.6	54.4
Romania	4.7	41.8	39.5
CSSR	13.4	13.1	15.0
USSR	7.3	17.9	17.1
Hungary	1.5	4.3	7.2

The conclusion to be drawn from the preceding table is that among the CEMA states, in part, considerable changes in favor of maritime transport are recorded. Maritime navigation of CEMA as a whole in 1970 came to a 12.7 percent share of the freight transported among CEMA member countries, to be compared with 7 to 7.5 percent during the 1950-1960 period. The tendency of the maritime transport share to rise at the very time the rate of growth of all kinds of CEMA transport was increasing reflects the importance due maritime transport at the present time. As a consequence of the fact that maritime transport among the countries of the socialist community of states is being built up and developed to the extent that geographical conditions make this possible, the opportunity has arisen of taking advantage of the transport cost savings for greater distances and

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

thereby contribute to lowering the prime costs of the goods to be transported. In addition to the foregoing, a large share of the rising volume of foreign trade transport between socialist and non-socialist countries is being handled by the CEMA merchant marine and through socialist ports, with the result that foreign exchange is being saved, which can therefore be utilized to import additional important products for the accomplishment of our principal task.

The growth in the volume of our maritime transport was made possible by a purposeful expansion and development of the CEMA state merchant marines and their ever-improving coordinated deployment, especially for line navigation of the CEMA navigation organizations. The development of the CEMA state merchant marines in recent years is shown by the following statistics:⁴

<u>Overall Situation as of 1 January</u>	<u>Number of ships</u>	<u>GRT in millions</u>	<u>tdw in millions</u>
1970	1,930	11,408	15,582
1971	2,010	12,070	16,656
1972	2,058	12,437	17,345
1973	2,104	12,838	18,115

Situation by Country
in 1973

			<u>Percent</u>	
USSR	1,451	9,200	71.3	12,688
Poland	264	1,474	11.4	2,219
GDR	194	1,028	8.4	1,464
Bulgaria	104	638	4.9	959
Romania	61	339	3.2	577
CSSR	11	115	0.9	168
Hungary	19	44	0.3	60

These data reveal the continuous development of the CEMA merchant marine which took place by putting newly built tonnage into service while eliminating at the same time overage tonnage. The CEMA fleet was composed as follows on 1 January 1973:

	<u>Number of ships</u>	<u>GRT in millions</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>tdw in millions</u>
Tankers	339	3,738	28.2	5,609
Freighters	1,765	9,160	71.8	12,506

The prime tendency of CEMA states is in the direction of dry freight tonnage, because petroleum and petroleum products are transported overland

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

in the first instance, especially over pipelines. In the course of the further growth and development of international trade relations, however, tanker tonnage is also being increased. Indicative of this are the giant tankers presently being constructed, particularly for the Soviet Union. From the differences between unit number and tonnage of the tanker fleet as compared with that of the freighter fleet there also is the consequence for the CEMA fleet that the average tonnage per ship is greater for tankers than for freighters. This is a result of the sharp diminution in the cost of transporting cargoes in tankers of ever increasing size.

The age composition of the CEMA merchant marine as of 1 January 1973, in percentages by age group, was as follows:⁵

<u>Country</u>	<u>Age Group by Years</u>					
	<u>1-5</u>	<u>6-10</u>	<u>11-15</u>	<u>16-20</u>	<u>21-25</u>	<u>26 and over</u>
USSR	30.0	40.8	17.1	8.4	0.6	3.1
Poland	46.8	27.7	17.6	3.2	0.8	3.9
GDR	16.1	30.1	35.5	11.5	6.5	0.3
Bulgaria	16.3	35.0	11.3	17.4	11.3	8.7
Romania	30.3	53.8	10.5	3.2	0.3	1.9
CSSR	31.5	60.8	7.7	----	----	----
Hungary	51.0	28.6	2.7	----	11.7	----

To be emphasized is that 68.9 percent of CEMA merchant ships are under 10 years of age, and only 4.9 percent of the ships are more than 20 years old. CEMA shipping is thus below the average age of the world merchant marine, and occupies a favorable position in view of the difficult conditions of the world market struggle. The profitable age composition, generally good condition of the ships, and the conscious, disciplined bearing of the crews all contribute together to the growing prestige and increasing recognition enjoyed by the socialist states among the people in all the ports of the world. The analysis of the CEMA merchant marine would be incomplete without presenting a breakdown by size.

The situation achieved as of 1 January 1973 was:⁶

<u>GRT Grouping</u>	<u>Ships</u>	<u>GRT Totals *</u>	<u>tdw Totals</u>
100-500	77	30,000	53,000
500-1,000	45	29,000	38,000
1,000-2,000	282	400,000	501,000
2,000-4,000	613	1,929,000	2,561,000
4,000-6,000	314	1,556,000	2,096,000
6,000-8,000	144	1,018,000	1,408,000
8,000-10,000	301	2,746,000	3,711,000
10,000-15,000	178	1,952,000	2,702,000
15,000-20,000	74	1,206,000	1,752,000

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<u>GRT Grouping</u>	<u>Ships</u>	<u>GRT Totals</u>	<u>tdw Totals</u>
20,000-25,000	39	868,000	1,389,000
25,000-30,000	4	103,000	174,000
30,000-40,000	31	978,000	1,577,000
40,000-50,000	2	83,000	153,000
Totals	2,104	12,898,000	18,115,000

This table makes it clear that over half of the CEMA merchant marine consists of ships up to 6,000 GRT. This characteristic and the large proportion of ships in the 6,000 to 20,000 GRT range have been determined by the tasks to be accomplished, the routes to be traveled, harbor conditions and various other considerations.

The Soviet Union, as the leading and strongest CEMA country, disposed of more than 1,535 general cargo freighters with a total tonnage of 6.2 million GRT in 1972, and ranked fourth in the world. It is anticipated in international shipping circles that the Soviet Union, after the completion of the extensive building contracts it has given out, will, with a total of more than 2 million tdw of general cargo freighter tonnage, take first place in the world in 1975. At the present time a large series of lumber transports, bulk carriers (32,000 up to 50,000 tdw), container ships (up to 40,000 tdw), roll-on-roll-off ships (4,000 to over 20,000 tdw), OBO /expansion unknown/ freighters (up to 100,000 tdw), and tankers (including other special constructions for arctic waters and giant tanker units) are either in process of being constructed or ordered.

During the immediately upcoming years the other CEMA countries are also further developing their merchant marines in the light of the experiences gained from scientific-technical progress in shipbuilding. At the same time harbors are being built up and developed in goal-directed fashion to speed up transshipments resulting from fleet growth and the increasing role of special-construction ships.

The CEMA Comprehensive Program: Guideline for Socialist Economic Integration of Navigation

With the Comprehensive Program for Further Deepening and Perfecting Cooperation and the Development of Socialist Economic Integration of the CEMA Member Countries, which was adopted by the 25th CEMA Meeting, July 1971, and which has been laid out for a 15 to 20 year period, there began a new historical stage in the economic and political integration of the community of socialist states. The elaboration and formulation of this all-embracing Comprehensive Program, only realizable under socialist conditions, corresponds in full measure to objective requirements for the development of world socialism.

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By socialist economic integration we mean a process of long-term, planned interweaving and gradual blending together of the various national economies into a unified economic organism. The Soviet Union has the leading role in this process, which is above all a product of the many long years of experience and the high level of social development that was achieved under the leadership of the CPSU. This process leads inevitably to a still closer drawing together of the peoples of the community of socialist states, and to a further shift of the international balance of forces in favor of socialism.

The Comprehensive Program also contains important findings for the area of transport and the maritime and harbor economy.⁷ A Working Group for Transportation has been part of the council from the beginning, and in 1958 there was constituted the CEMA Permanent Commission for Transport, whose principal task is the implementation of economic and scientific-technical cooperation in the development of all branches of transport. The work organ for navigation and shipping is Section Three of the CEMA Permanent Commission for Transport. This is where the maritime transport problems that arise from the process of socialist economic integration are directly discussed and solved. Section Four is a permanent organ for the manifold coordination of the CEMA shipbuilding industry. The activity of this section contributed to the specialization and standardization of the construction of oceangoing vessels and inland waterway ships, and of ship equipment. Because of the specialization of the shipyards, which accompanied this, and because of the construction of great series of ships, positive results were achieved for CEMA navigation. A Bureau for Coordinating the Chartering of Oceangoing Vessels was formed as an interstate organization. It coordinates the chartering of ships and performs very extensive work in synchronizing plans for reciprocal utilization of CEMA shipping tonnage. The requirement of the Comprehensive Program, "to conduct mutual consultations on a bi- or multilateral basis concerning the principal tendencies of transport policy, and to coordinate transport plans with individual problems for the sake of longer-term planning," was purposefully implemented. Mutual consultations, synchronization of navigation policy, and joint operations in the maritime transport markets are regular daily practices today and contribute importantly to the fact that the merchant marines of the CEMA countries are also respected by the traditional maritime shipping countries, and are experiencing a growing measure of recognition.

In recent years a great number of bilateral and multilateral agreements at the governmental level concerning problems of the maritime and harbor economy were concluded among the CEMA countries, and also among VEB's and institutes. The "general conditions for mutual provision of shipping tonnage" called for in the CEMA Comprehensive Program have come into force in the meantime, and the agreements for meeting the need for repair capacity for the merchant marines have resulted in the improvement and acceleration of repair work, and also in raising maritime operational

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

readiness. Data processing and mathematical methods are being employed to an ever greater extent for the regulation and management of maritime transport and harbor economy, and contribute to a more rational and fuller utilization of basic capital resources. The automated management system "ASU /expansion unknown/-Ocean Transport" of the USSR,⁸ which embraces 2,000 ships, 70 Soviet ports, and some 3,000 ports of call throughout the world, constitutes the long-term basic guide for perfecting the management of the shipping and chartering organizations of the other CEMA maritime countries.

Essential progress was achieved in the area of international line navigation because of implementation of the Comprehensive Program through intensification of cooperation. Whereas in 1970 a total of 426 CEMA ships were employed in 93 navigation lines that shipped 16 million tons of freight, the use of line navigation rose in 1972 to 604 ships on 98 lines, which transported a total of 18.5 million tons of goods. This progressive development is being purposefully continued by further productivity increases on the existing lines and by setting up new lines. It is a matter of joint line services of CEMA states on the one hand, and on the other, also of such as are set up on a contractual basis with capitalist ship-owners. All these measures contribute to the extension of international economic relations and reflect the growing influence of the community of socialist states in the world.

Cooperation in economic, technical and organizational areas of navigation was enriched by the foundation of the International Shipowners Association (INSA) in June 1970, to which shipowner organizations of all CEMA countries engaged in navigation belong, including Yugoslavia. The activity of the Permanent Commissions for Technology, Economy, Juridical Questions and Documentation made possible more intensive coordination of work and a unified posture in the world economy.⁹

The establishment of the economic organization "Interport" between Poland and the GDR in the area of harbor economy also reflected the transition to new and higher forms of cooperation pursuant to the Comprehensive Program. The joint communique concerning the visit of the GDR party and government delegation to Poland in June 1974 especially emphasizes the significance of this economic organization for future cooperation. A great number of bilateral state navigation agreements were concluded with capitalist states in recent years by CEMA countries, particularly by the Soviet Union. These contracts contribute to an improvement of international relations and constitute a component part of the foreign policy for the implementation of peaceful coexistence which has been agreed upon within the community of socialist states.

The CEMA Merchant Marine: An Important Factor in International Navigation and International Policy

An essential goal set by the CEMA Comprehensive Program reads to the effect: "Strengthening the position of the CEMA member countries in the world economy, and as a consequence guaranteeing victory in world competition with capitalism, and strengthening the defense capability of the CEMA member countries."¹⁰

As is apparent from the way this goal has been formulated, thus socialist economic integration is also a decisive factor in making economically secure the national defenses of the Warsaw Pact states. Growing importance is accorded this point of view in socialist military science and socialist military economics.

The uninterrupted development of navigation and the CEMA fleet, their increasingly coordinated deployment in building up foreign trade relations among the CEMA countries and with third countries has resulted in the fact that socialist merchant vessels are permanently to be found today on all the oceans of the world and in almost all big harbors. Because of the level of development achieved, it also became possible for socialist countries to participate in ever increasing measure with their fleets in the traditional international navigation conferences. It thereby became possible to obtain, among other things, more favorable conditions for the employment of our merchant marine, without having to renounce basic principles of foreign trade policy in the process.

The deployment of the merchant vessels of the CEMA countries is of decisive importance in maintaining maritime ties and for protecting vitally important transportation both for the community of socialist states as well as for the peoples who are fighting imperialism for their national liberty.

Imperialist states repeatedly used embargo policy and maritime blockade, in old imperialist style, to eliminate progressive governments and movements from the world. In this connection the behavior of U.S. imperialism may be recalled, with its moves to choke off the revolution in Cuba by a trade and shipping blockade. The objective here was to exploit unscrupulously the one-sided economic structure of Cuba as a sugar cane producer, and its consequent dependence on export trade as well on the importation of almost all necessary consumer goods. When in March 1960, however, the first tanker, flying the flag of the Soviet Union, delivered 11,000 tons of petroleum to revolutionary Cuba, it became very apparent that even in overseas areas imperialism can no longer operate without hindrance. Today millions of tons of petroleum and many other products are transported annually to Cuba from the Soviet Union and the other countries of the community of socialist states. Imperialist blockade moves were thereby proven to be ineffectual.

The support of the heroically fighting Vietnamese people by the long-term maintenance of ocean transport by the socialist fleets also contributed to an important degree to victory over U.S. imperialism. The sailors of the participating socialist fleets accomplished outstanding things in this connection, and fulfilled their internationalist obligations with honor. Just these few facts make clear the close connection of policy, economy and national defense, and prove that in the case of the socialist merchant fleets, the economic and the political-military areas must both be taken into consideration.

Not only the flags of the socialist merchant marine, but also those of USSR Navy, today fly on all oceans of the world. In this way our Soviet brothers-in-arms fulfill upon these oceans an important international task, that of preserving and guaranteeing peace in the world.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Communique of the 18 April 1974 Meeting of the Political Advisory Committee of the Warsaw Pact Member States." In: HORIZONT (Berlin), No 18, 1974, p 4.
2. Gathered together from: "Statistisches Jahrbuch 1973 der DDR" (GDR Statistical Yearbook for 1973), Berlin, 1973, p 21 (Appendix); and the "Statistisches Jahrbuch des RGW" (CEMA Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1973, p 284 (Russian).
3. "Statistisches Jahrbuch des RGW," Moscow, 1973, p 296 (Russian).
4. "Die Seetransportflotte der Laender des RGW" (The Ocean Transport Fleet of the CEMA Countries), Moscow, various annual series (Russian). All merchant ships above 100 GWT, exclusive of fishing vessels and other ships not used in mercantile navigation.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Cf "Komplexprogramm des RGW, Ausschnitt 12, Pkt. 3" (CEMA Comprehensive Program, excerpt 12, point 3). In: DOKUMENTE RGW, Berlin, 1971, p 11 ff.
8. See J. Buresch and others: "ASU-Seetransport der UdSSR" (ASU-Ocean Transport of the USSR). In: SEEWIRTSCHAFT (Berlin), Vol 10, 1973, p 730 ff.
9. See H. Prager, "Tasks and Goals of the INSA." In: SEEWIRTSCHAFT (Berlin), Vol 7, 1973, p 485 ff.
10. Cf "CEMA Comprehensive Program," loc. cit., p 17 f.

PROBLEMS CITED IN ANTI-MINE EQUIPMENT

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Oct 74 pp 119C-122C

[By Lt Comdr A. Godomski]

/Text/ The experiences and insights which have been collected in the course of breakdowns, damages and losses of anti-mine equipment must be used as a basis for prophylactic measures and for highly specialized training for anti-mine personnel on board. This conclusion is based on the following facts:

- Breakdowns, damages and losses take place annually, and their repair and replacement calls for a considerable financial expenditure;
- The length of time the materiel is out of service, due to requisitioning, procurement and delivery, is still relatively high;
- The net inventory of ships and boats ready for prompt employment is thereby reduced.

Changes in Naval Weaponry

Anti-mine and antisubmarine equipment play an important role. Depending on the combat functions of the units, their principal armament is either anti-mine or antisubmarine equipment, and they possess mine-sweeping boats, mine-laying and mine-clearing ships, antisubmarine ships, and coastal defense ships.

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Every sailor in the coastal blockade and antisubmarine service must master the performance under all conditions of all the tasks prescribed by regulations for mine-laying, mine-clearing, use of depth charges and the deployment of ship demolition squads. In doing this, it must be borne in mind that great changes have taken place in anti-mine equipment and will also take place more rapidly in the future. With the introduction into the area of responsibility of anti-mine personnel of complete installations, including complex combinations of power machinery, switchboards, control apparatus and service consoles, it has become necessary to put a stop to thinking in old terms about anti-mine equipment.

The manifold nature of anti-mine equipment not only makes high demands on the sailors in the coastal blockade and antisubmarine service, but also calls for a rethinking on the part of instructors and commanders, above all with reference to the training and educational processes. Here the goals for the instructors should be:

- personally inducing a correct attitude toward his weaponry;
- increasing his own personal responsibility;
- correct evaluation of the function and significance of his area of responsibility;
- perfecting knowledge, capacities and skills for the sake of a permanent increase in combat and deployment readiness.

Attitudes that find expression in low evaluations of anti-mine equipment must be fought energetically. That really constitutes a prophylactic procedure in the truest sense of the word.

The avoidance of breakdowns is principally a matter of:

- the observance of equipment parameters with still more consciousness of responsibility on the part of the commanding officers during the practical use of anti-mine equipment and technical devices;
- a more precise implementation of the "organization of planned preventive maintenance" and;
- overcoming all kinds of superficiality and lack of appreciation for analytical activity at all levels.

Implementation of the DaB /Service Regulations at Sea/: Basis for the Effective Use of Anti-mine Equipment

Thoroughgoing analysis of breakdowns proves that investigations are still often concluded with superficial findings.

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Jamming cutting cable, losses from running aground, the ripping out of a towing pin are only secondary phenomena. The occasion or primary cause lies in the fact that the basic regulation for service on board is still not always being observed adequately. It is not necessary in this place to go into detail interpreting and explaining particular passages, for the regulations are quite clear. They demand from the responsible party in practice corresponding to concrete conditions a great deal of circumspection, initiative and independent judgment. Under no circumstances is it correct to say: "This is only an exercise or a training task--in actual use everything is clear." Precisely the DaB, just like all other regulations, makes no distinctions of this sort, and does not permit shortcuts and cutbacks.

Just how necessary it is to hold as closely as possible to the principles in the basic document shall be set forth in what follows.

Changes in course and maneuvers of all kinds are elements of training and required, depending on the situation, in managing the ship. They are simulated, but also necessary when the situation suddenly calls for it. It is particularly important to take into consideration, as early as when the data are being worked up, maneuvers for traveling with fully deployed equipment or during the deployment or packing up of the equipment.

Practice shows, however, that the required parameters, like those for speed, adjustment of equipment, changes of angle on the horizontal plane during changes in the ship's course are not always followed. This leads irresistably to damage and even loss of equipment. To eliminate damage and losses of this sort in the future, the following should be observed: first, the correct use of equipment; second, language for giving orders and reports which confirms to the regulations.

Clearing and mine sweeping equipment of all kinds are not completely self-supporting, self-moving, floating devices. They require floating support buoys, cutting cables and other kinds of control equipment. Even before their deployment some devices have to be adjusted to or controlled by settings ordered or which have been prescribed by the regulations. That is one precondition. The second aspect is the speed prescribed and required by each type of device. Only when both components are functioning is it possible to accomplish the task prescribed for the device, and to guarantee a successful sweeping operation. The way in which the framework of the mine sweeping device is put together is of course not unimportant, particularly with reference to the lines, cables and other parts of the equipment. This work was mastered in its essentials. Mistakes did, to be sure, show up in the way the lines were attached. For this reason it should once again be pointed out that it must not be allowed to happen that lines cast to the right or to the left are then attached to the wrong side of the framework. When the lines in question are switched in error, differences in the depth of the position of the framework then occur,

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caused by the force which is the result of the lay of the line and the velocity.

The language for giving orders and the language for making reports plays a particularly large role in the employment of anti-mine equipment, and it must be implemented absolutely without compromise. With reference to the deployment of anti-mine equipment, the following points of view are pertinent:

- As a matter of general principle, the selection of the equipment, of the system, and of the procedure, as well as the deployment for action or the closing down for storage are all subject to the command process;
- Proven and suspected changes, which weaken and limit the readiness of anti-mine equipment for deployment must be reported without delay;
- Necessary steps are to be taken immediately;
- Maneuvering must as a rule be subordinated to the exigencies of deploying one's own weapons.

From this there flows the additional conclusion: For the effective deployment of one's own combat resources, the management of the ship, the navigation section, and the anti-mine section must be adjusted to one another, must remain in permanent contact, and must work closely together.

PVI /Planned Preventive Maintenance/ as Criterion of Readiness for Deployment

The principal task of the PVI in the maintenance system is to reduce expenditures for repairs which have not been planned for, by planned preventive measures, and to guarantee reliable deployment of military technology during the period of utilization. When PVI is neglected or absolutely not carried out, then that results in increased breakdown times completely left to chance.

In the area of anti-mine equipment there are a few concentration points for breakdowns which are for the most part avoidable. These are, without regard to their proportionate share overall: servicing not in accordance with the regulations; utilization for purposes never intended; imperfect or incomplete maintenance; PVI that is not carried out in a professional properly informed manner; disregard of the required parameters and accuracy to gauge; inattention to the completeness and balanced supplementing of devices and facilities, systems, accessories, replacement parts and tools; neglected replacement of worn out and obsolescent structural elements; failure to analyze fuels; incomplete and imperfect changeovers in fuels, inadequate lubrication, preservation procedures and cleanings; arbitrarily ordered interruptions in PVI work and the redeployment of personnel to other work.

The reasons for this are varied. There are subjective and objective causes. All reasons have not been determined as yet. Here are a few:

- the partially insufficient preparation of all comrades ideologically and materially;
- insufficiently stabilized consciousness of responsibility;
- deficient practical knowledge and skills;
- operations executed in part in superficial way;
- inadequately full utilization of time available;
- no technological work cards appropriate to the level of training;
- incomplete controls;
- unsatisfactory cooperation between personnel aboard ship and the mechanics in the workshops.

The situation is by no means such that the key problems named, and their causes, are to be generally encountered or even show up in concentrated fashion. The important thing is to take these key problems into consideration in all training measures and in daily work. This affects personnel aboard ship as well as the mechanics in the workshops and warehouse administrators.

Only if every comrade completely devotes himself day in and day out without interruption to overcoming the still existing deficiencies in his area of responsibility, will we be in a situation where we can further expand the success and progress hitherto achieved in our joint work. We, that is to say the coastal blockade sailors, mates, master, mechanics, warehouse administrators and specialists at all levels.

Analytical Activity

Analytical activity serves as a resource and a method for raising readiness for service.

Every analysis must be appropriately exploited with staff personnel, that is, it is no end in itself. It does not just interpret a condition, but must serve as a practical introduction to operations, deeds and changes. Every analytical activity likewise calls for a self-critical evaluation of one's own work, regardless of the level at which the work is performed.

Analytical activity is not only analysis in the form of reports and proposals, but also controls of every kind and exploitations and evaluations

at every level of command. Furthermore, attention must unquestionably be paid to seeing to it that findings, conclusions, pronouncements and results find expression in daily labor and highly specialized training. There not only exists a close connection between PVI and highly specialized training, but also between analytical activity, highly specialized training, and the degree of readiness for operations.

In what follows, breakdowns, damages and losses as well as short-time disturbances are viewed analytically.

What is a disturbance? A disturbance is every kind of impact on normal conditions which results in breakdown or loss of a ship, of technical facilities, systems, equipment and arrangements, or to a diminution of the utility value and security of operations of the same without consideration of the duration of the breakdown.

When a disturbance has taken place, there must then be, in addition to an investigation of the causes and of the full extent of disturbing event, a professionally correct report setting forth the situation. This is necessary and useful for filling out the technical report (TM) and subsequently in initiating concrete measures.

Also useful to this end are practical exercises on board ship or instructional methodological courses.

This is also true as regards evaluations of disturbances, which currently, at least in part, are still under-appreciated. The evaluation of a disturbance serves as an analysis of the event of the disturbance, its causes, and for an evaluation of the operational security of the ship and of the level of training of the crew. The content of the disturbance questionnaire is specifically directed at the evaluation or investigation of:

- the operational security of the technology;
- the training level of the crew;
- attrition values for certain parts of the facilities so as to establish maximum duration norms;
- the degree of appropriateness with which ships and warehouses are equipped with spare parts;
- demand requirements for repair capacity;
- causes.

Only in this connection and in their full range are disturbance evaluations to be viewed and set forth, so as to obtain from those directly involved in serving there the necessary data and testimony.

Incidentally, these necessary paperwork jobs are executed superficially because of ignorance of the relationships involved or for other reasons. And so it is precisely here that large reserves are to be found for prophylactic work whereby breakdowns are to be avoided.

The same manner of looking at things is also required for controls, expansions, instructional methodological courses, and analyses of the specialists.

To give controls, exploitation schemes and analyses the place and content that is intended for them, they must serve for guidance, help, education, forward moving development and improvement in the sense of heightening readiness to serve.

In closing it should be emphasized once again that anti-mine and antisubmarine equipment have been further developed in considerable degree in recent years. Extensive knowledge and a great many skills as well as a consciousness of responsibility are consequently necessary for training, servicing, care, maintenance and repairs of this equipment.

Since there can be no limit in our work as regards the continuous increase in combat readiness and readiness to serve, all reserves for effective deployment must be utilized, and deficiencies still existing must be eliminated. What is called for is to overcome by great initiative, circumspectly and consistently all obstacles, difficulties and contradictions.